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I. INTRODUCTION
The absolute prohibition of torture is one of a handful of
rarefied, jus cogens peremptory norms of international law.1
Humanity has collectively concluded that acts of torture are so vile
and repugnant that they countenance no exceptions. As a matter of
law, neither good intentions, resource limitations, exhaustion of
viable alternatives, nor prevention of future harm may excuse it.
Thus, torture can never be justified.2 An important corollary of the
universal torture prohibition is the bar on removing noncitizens to
countries where they may be tortured, commonly called nonrefoulement.3 Like the absolute prohibition of torture, the ban on
refoulement is absolute.4
1. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Matter of J-E-,
23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 310 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc), (Rosenberg, dissenting) (quoting Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 890).
2. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Even in war, torture is
not authorized.”); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 2(2),
[hereinafter CAT] (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification of torture.”).
3. CAT, supra note 2, art. 3.
4. See Margit Ammer & Andrea Schuechner, Principle of Non-Refoulement, in THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND ITS OPTIONAL PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY
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The Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) serves to codify
these norms and to create a global framework for implementing
them.5 In 1994, the United States ratified the CAT, subject to certain
reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”).6 In 1998,
Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act
(FARRA) to implement its CAT obligations.7 In 1999, the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgated regulations
aimed at implementing US CAT obligations in removal
proceedings.8 The emergence of CAT relief for noncitizens
challenging their removal gave immigrant advocates hope for an
alternative means to avoid severe harm in the context of rising
restrictions on other forms of relief from removal.9
Notwithstanding the historical, ableist roots of US
immigration restrictions,10 more recently, noncitizens with
psychosocial disabilities11 have gained access to critical forms of
98, 114 (Manfred Nowak et al. eds., 2d ed. 2019). Note, however, that this obligation is
distinct from the non-refoulement duty described in the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. See id. at art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
5. CAT, supra note 2, art. 3(1) (“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
6. Declarations and Reservations Made upon Ratification, Accession, or Succession,
1830 U.N.T.S. 320 (Oct. 21, 1994).
7. Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G, Title XXII, 112 Stat. 2681-2822 (codified as Note to 8
U.S.C. § 1231). FARRA forbids that United States “expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822
(1998) (“It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
8. Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8,478 (Feb.
19, 1999) (codified as 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16-1208.18).
9. Jon Bauer, Obscured by "Willful Blindness": States' Preventive Obligations and the
Meaning of Acquiescence Under the Convention Against Torture, 52 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
738, 744 (2021).
10. See DOUGLAS C. BAYNTON, DEFECTIVES IN THE LAND: DISABILITY AND IMMIGRATION IN
THE AGE OF EUGENICS 13-23 (2016) (documenting the eugenics movement’s advocacy to
screen immigrants for defects); see also generally JAY TIMOTHY DOLMAGE, DISABLED UPON
ARRIVAL: EUGENICS, IMMIGRATION, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACE AND DISABILITY 13-23
(2018).
11. Although many immigration adjudicators refer to “mental illness” rather than
“psychosocial disability,” we use the latter term herein in deference to civil society groups
representing users and survivors of psychiatry. See, e.g., World Network of Users and
Survivors of Psychiatry, Implementation Manual for the United Nations Convention on the
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assistance to invoke the regulatory grounds for relief from removal
under CAT. Importantly, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
decision Matter of M-A-M- granted persons who are “mentally
incompetent” to represent themselves in removal proceedings the
rare right to counsel at public expense in removal proceedings.12
Further, pursuant to the Franco v. Holder class action settlement in
2013,13 the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”)
established the National Qualified Representative Program
(“NQRP”) to implement the same immigration statutory provision
requiring safeguards for incompetent respondents.14 NQRP
currently operates in twenty-four of the thirty-one states with
immigration courts,15 providing “Qualified Representatives”
(“QRs”) to certain unrepresented and detained respondents who
are found by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) or the BIA to be mentally
incompetent to represent themselves in immigration
proceedings.”16
Rights
of
Persons
with
Disabilities
9
(2008),
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/COP/WNUSP%20CRPD%20Manual.doc. At
the same time, we recognize that many members of this community identify less as
“persons with disabilities” than “psychiatric survivors.” See, e.g., Judi Chamberlain,
Rehabilitating Ourselves: The Psychiatric Survivor Movement, 24 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH 39
(1995).
12. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (B.I.A. 2011) (interpreting 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(3)).
13. See Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010); FrancoGonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211 DMG (DTBx), 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23,
2013). In addition, the Central District of California’s permanent injunction framed access
to a Qualified Representative as a reasonable accommodation owed to noncitizens with
disabilities under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at *1.
14. See Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, to All
Immigration Judges, on Nationwide Policy to Provide Enhanced Procedural Protections to
Unrepresented Detained Aliens with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions, at 3 (Aug. 1,
2002). The EOIR further ordered US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to
identify ICE detainees who may be mentally incompetent under Matter of M-A-M-. See
Memorandum from John Morton, ICE Director, to Thomas D. Homan, Peter S. Vincent, &
Kevin Landy, on Civil Immigration Detention: Guidance for New Identification and
Information-Sharing Procedures Related to Unrepresented Detainees with Serious Mental
Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013).
15. Greg Chen & Jorge Loweree, Policy Brief: The Biden Administration and Congress
Must Guarantee Legal Representation for People Facing Removal, AILA Doc. No. 21011501
(Jan. 15, 2021). See also VENUE, RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE, AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL, IMMIGR.
LAW & CRIMES § 8:23.
OF
JUST.,
16. National
Qualified
Representative
Program,
DEP’T
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/national-qualified-representative-program-nqrp
[https://perma.cc/T9TX-HDRN] (last visited Mar. 23, 2022); Michael Corradini, National
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At the same time, restrictions to other forms of relief to
removal have heightened. As one practitioner has recently
observed, “For a growing proportion of asylum seekers, CAT relief
provides the only path to protection,” citing a steep decline in IJs’
asylum and withholding grant rates, from 56% in 2014 to 28% in
2020.17 This holds especially true for noncitizens with
psychosocial disabilities, who frequently are barred from non-CAT
removal relief due to their prior criminal histories.18 Thus,
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities’ prospects for removal
relief increasingly depend on whether they can convince IJs that
coercive mental health practices amount to torture (“CAT claims”).
These developments coincide with rising concerns over the
suffering caused by coercive mental health practices.19 Globally,
the adoption and implementation of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) has
drawn attention to the human rights implications of mental health
coercion.20 Institutional mental health settings, such as state-run
psychiatric hospitals, routinely employ coercive forms of
“treatment” that are intolerable in other settings. For example,
Qualified Representative Program, VERA INST., https://www.vera.org/projects/nationalqualified-representative-program [https://perma.cc/U3CH-4QVM] (last visited Mar. 23,
2022).
17. Bauer, supra note 9, at 744-45.
18. A host of criminal offenses, and even charges, may be considered “particularly
serious crimes” that render noncitizens ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) & 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). For a classic treatise on the intersection
of mental health and the criminal legal system, see generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN
PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000).
19. See United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution on Mental health and
human rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/43/13, ¶ 7 (July 1, 2020) (rejecting mental health
care regimes reliant on "biomedical interventions, coercion, medicalization and
institutionalization”); United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution on Mental Health
and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/L.25, ¶ 8 (2017) (urging states to “abandon all
practices that fail to respect the rights, will and preferences of all persons, on an equal
basis” and to “provide mental health services for persons with mental health conditions or
psychosocial disabilities on the same basis as to those without disabilities, including on the
basis of free and informed consent”). See generally MENTAL HEALTH, LEGAL CAPACITY, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ashley Stein et al. eds., 2021); COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND
POLICY (Bernadette Mcsherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013); WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW
CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMANITARIAN LAW, TORTURE IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS:
REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE’S 2013 THEMATIC REPORT (2014).
20. See Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter CRPD]; see also Dainius Puras & Piers
Gooding, Mental Health and Human Rights in the 21st Century, 18 WORLD PSYCH. 42 (2019).
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mental health workers have exceeded prescribed regimens by
punishing, intimidating, or coercing persons with psychosocial
disabilities to the point of severe harm and death.21 Other
routinized forms of coercion are justified as “treatment,” even
though they are exclusively or disproportionately applied in
segregated mental health facilities. These include nonconsensual
psychosurgeries, use of electroshock without safeguards,22
administration of chemical restraints,23 and prolonged application
of mechanical restraints.24 Since the CRPD’s adoption in 2006,
United Nations (“UN”) treaty bodies and special mandate holders
have characterized many of these acts as forms of torture.25
21. See generally Phil Fennell, Article 15: Protection against Torture and Cruel or
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A COMMENTARY 426 (Ilias Bantekas, Michael Ashley Stein, &
Dimitris Anastasiou eds., 2018); Janet E. Lord, Shared Understanding or Consensus-Masked
Disagreement? The Anti-Torture Framework in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2010).
22. See Manfred Nowak (Special Rapporteur on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Interim Report, U.N. Doc. A/63/175, ¶ 61 (July 28,
2008) [hereinafter SRT Interim Report 2008]; Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/53, ¶ 63 (Feb. 1, 2013) [hereinafter SRT Report 2013]. See also EUR. COMM. FOR
THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT ¶ 39
(Mar. 21, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/16807001c3 [https://perma.cc/9R72-GQZM]
[hereinafter CPT Standards]; Fennell, supra note 21, at 459-60 (discussing cases); Natalie
Drew et al., Human Rights Violations of People with Mental and Psychosocial Disabilities: An
Unresolved Global Crisis, 378 THE LANCET 1164, 1168 (2011).
23. See SRT Interim Report 2008, supra note 22, ¶ 63; see also Fennell supra note 21,
at 451-52 (discussing cases); Lord, supra note 21, at 60 (“The use of medication,
particularly psychotropic medications, either on prisoners or persons with disabilities in
institutions where overmedication is used as a form of chemical restraint for treatment (or
punishment) will also fall afoul of the proscription.”).
24. See SRT Report 2013, supra note 22 at ¶ 63; SRT Interim Report 2008, supra note
22, ¶ 55; see also Fennell, supra note 21, at 459-60 (discussing cases).
25. See, e.g., Catalina Devandas-Aguilar (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities), Report, U.N. Doc. A/73/161, ¶ 14 (July 16, 2018) (criticizing pre-CRPD
instruments for having “justified the use of coercion against persons with disabilities in
health care, including involuntary treatment and hospitalization, solitary confinement, the
use of restraints and forced sterilization on the basis of notions of ‘medical necessity’ and
‘dangerousness’”); UN Human Rights Council, Resolution on Mental health and human
rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/18, p. 2 (July 18, 2016) (recognizing that “unlawful or
arbitrary institutionalization, overmedicalization and treatment practices that fail to
respect their autonomy, will and preferences” may constitute torture); CRPD Committee,
Concluding observations on the initial report of Chile, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/CHL/CO/1, ¶ 33
(Apr. 13, 2016) (expressing “deep concern that practices such as psychosurgery,
electroconvulsive therapy, extended isolation in cells without heating or basic services,
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Yet many noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities fail to
convince IJs of the same. While the vast majority of CAT claims
fail,26 IJs’ denials of CAT claims by noncitizens with psychosocial
disabilities dramatically highlight themes central to the global
struggle to combat mental health coercion. Specifically, some
adjudicators have concluded that the harm that CAT claimants
with psychosocial disabilities fear in institutional mental health
settings is not sufficiently intentional to trigger the United States’
non-refoulement duty under US national law. In this view, evidence
of environmental factors or mental health workers’ non-torturous
motivations prevent coercive mental health practices from
warranting CAT relief. When so deciding, these IJs ascribe coercive
practices to good intentions, resource limitations, lack of viable
alternatives, or prevention of future harm. Accordingly, IJs’ denials
of CAT claims raise important normative and practical questions
about how adjudicators apply national legal standards that
transpose international obligations to mental health coercion.27
Herein, we review a unique sample of 49 unpublished IJ
decisions denying noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities’
claims for relief under CAT. Part II frames our analysis of IJs’ CAT
claim denials by describing growing global concerns about
coercion in mental health care settings. Part III summarizes
relevant US legal standards for CAT claims. Part IV identifies trends
in how IJs apply these standards to CAT claims predicated on
coercive mental health practices. Part V discusses how these
trends are at counter purposes with the worldwide movement
[and] physical restraints” were used “with the sole purpose of ‘disciplining’ or ‘correcting
deviant behavior’ in persons with psychosocial disabilities”); Juan E. Méndez, Introduction,
in TORTURE IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS, supra note 19, at xix (urging States to ban mental
health coercive measures “including the non-consensual administration of psychosurgery,
electroshock and mind-altering drugs for both long- and short-term application”).
26. For context, in FY2018, EOIR reported 1,334 grants of CAT relief and 25,964
denials. See Table 16. DEP’T OF JUST. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE I-862 INITIAL AND
SUBSEQUENT
CASE
COMPLETIONS
BY
DECISION,
EOIR
STATISTIC
YEARBOOK
FY
2018,
30,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/J9SC-W6KW].
27. For present purposes, we focus on the practical implications of trends in IJs’
adjudication of CAT claims by noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities, while recognizing
the significant normative ramifications at the intersection of CAT, the CRPD, and mental
health coercion. For one such thoughtful exploration, see Michael L. Perlin, International
Human Rights and Institutional Forensic Psychiatry: The Core Issues, in THE USE OF COERCIVE
MEASURES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC CARE (Birgit Völlm & Norbert Nedopil eds., 2016).

788

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:5

away from coercive mental health practices. Part VI offers concrete
recommendations for practitioners representing CAT claimants
with psychosocial disabilities, for US immigration adjudicators and
policy-makers, and for international monitors. We conclude with
brief reflections on the implications of CAT claim adjudications for
the United States’ fulfillment of its international obligations.
II. COERCION IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE SETTINGS
“Prejudicial laws and harmful social conventions regarding
people with disabilities have existed since antiquity.”28 Persons
with psychosocial disabilities have experienced an especially lurid
history of systematic human rights violations involving
involuntary institutionalization, experimentation, sterilization,
and incapacitation.29 Historically, such violations have perhaps
been nowhere more prevalent than in institutional mental health
settings.30

28. Michael Ashley Stein et al., Disability, in 2 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL Encyclopedia OF
LEGAL HISTORY 334 (Stanley N. Katz et al. eds., 2009).
29. See generally Matthew S. Smith & Michael Ashley Stein, Connecting the Right of
Collective Legal Capacity by Indigenous Peoples with the Right of Individual Legal Capacity
by Persons with Disabilities, 9 INT’L HUM. RTS. L.R. 147, 158 (2020) (collecting cases from
the European Court of Human Rights). Recent scholarship has also exposed the
intersectional dimensions of these violations. See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Deviancy,
Dependency, and Disability: The Forgotten History of Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68
DUKE L.J. 417, 419 (2018); MAB SEGREST, ADMINISTRATIONS OF LUNACY: RACISM AND THE
HAUNTING OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY AT THE MILLEDGEVILLE ASYLUM (2020); MARTIN SUMMERS,
MADNESS IN THE CITY OF MAGNIFICENT INTENTIONS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND MENTAL ILLNESS IN
THE NATION’S CAPITAL (2019); WENDY GONAVER, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN PSYCHIATRY 1840-1880 (2018).
30. Andrés J. Gallegos, Misperceptions Of People With Disabilities Lead To Low-Quality
Care: How Policy Makers Can Counter The Harm And Injustice, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 1,
2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20210325.480382
[https://perma.cc/D4X6-KQYW] (“Explicit and implicit discriminatory bias within the
health care professions represent an insidious virus against which people with disabilities
have been fighting for decades.”); see also Ending Coercion in Mental Health: The Need for
a Human Rights-based Approach, Resolution 2291, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ¶ 2 (2019),
https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=28038&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/8NJD-G9HV] [hereinafter Council of Europe] (noting "the use of
involuntary measures in mental health settings mainly results from a culture of
confinement which focuses and relies on coercion to ‘control’ and ‘treat’ patients who are
considered potentially ‘dangerous’ to themselves or others”).
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Coercion31 has long been endemic to mental health care
systems.32 Premised on “the traditional psychiatric view that
providers should determine the direction of treatment . . .
providers unilaterally decide what is best for people diagnosed
with mental health conditions.”33 Not coincidentally, coercive
practices are most prevalent “in settings that are isolated from the
lives of service users,” where providers exert exclusive control and
can avoid scrutiny.34 Troublingly, coercion may be on the rise,35
despite greater empirical evidence of how coercive methods
undermine therapeutic aims.36
31. There has yet to emerge a consensus definition of coercion in mental health
contexts. Some have pointed to the Oxford English Dictionary definition, which
characterizes coercion as persuasion “by using force or threats.” Piers Gooding et al.,
Alternatives to Coercion in Mental Health Settings: A Literature Review, MELBOURNE SOC.
EQUITY
INST.
9
(2018),
https://socialequity.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/2898525/Alternatives
-to-Coercion-Literature-Review-Melbourne-Social-Equity-Institute.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P943-JXKP]. Importantly, coercion is not necessarily coterminous with
“involuntary.” Indeed, some patients receiving involuntary treatment have reported not
feeling coerced, while other patients receiving voluntary treatment have reported
coercion. See John Monahan et al., Coercion in the Provision of Mental Health Services: The
MacArthur Studies in RESEARCH IN COMMUNITY AND MENTAL HEALTH, VOL. 10: COERCION IN
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES – INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 13-30, 27 (Joseph P. Morrissey &
John Monahan eds., 1999).
32. See generally Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Mental Health and
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/36 (July 24, 2018). See also Jiri Raboch et al., Use of
Coercive Measures During Involuntary Hospitalization: Findings From Ten European
Countries, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1012, 1012–17 (2010).
33. See Charlene Sunkel et al., Lived Experience Perspectives from Australia, Canada,
Kenya, Cameroon and South Africa – Conceptualising the Realities, in MENTAL HEALTH, LEGAL
CAPACITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 317 (Michael Ashley Stein et al. eds., 2021).
34. Benjamin A. Barsky et al., Redefining International Mental Health Care in the Wake
of the COVID-19 Pandemic, in MENTAL HEALTH, LEGAL CAPACITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 244
(Michael Ashley Stein et al. eds., 2021).
35. Council of Europe, supra note 30, ¶ 1 (observing “growing number of persons
with mental health conditions or psychosocial disabilities are subject to coercive measures
. . . . [e]ven in countries where so-called restrictive laws have been introduced to reduce
the recourse to such measures”); see also Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of
Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental
Health, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/34 (Apr. 12, 2019).
36. See generally BRADLEY FOXLEWIN, WHAT IS HAPPENING AT THE SECLUSION REVIEW THAT
MAKES A DIFFERENCE? A CONSUMER LED RESEARCH STUDY (ACT Mental Health Consumer
Network, 2012); Christina Katsakou et al., “Psychiatric Patients” Views on Why their
Involuntary Hospitalisation was Right or Wrong: A Qualitative Study, 47 SOC. PSYCH. &
PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1169 (2012); Caroline Larue et al., The Experience of Seclusion
and Restraint in Psychiatric Settings: Perspectives of Patients, 34 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH
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Coercion in institutional mental health settings knows many
forms, “including different forms of restraint (mechanical, physical
or pharmacological), forcible seclusion in confined spaces,
treatment by administration of medication without the person’s
consent and restrictive conditions imposed as part of treatment
and supervision in the community.”37 Although the forms of
coercion may vary across socio-economically diverse contexts
there are more commonalities than differences across
countries, including misconceptions around mental health,
stigma and discrimination, chronic underfunding of mental
health services, a lack of available options to respond to what
might be perceived as disruptive behavior or emotional crisis
and an acceptance of the use of coercion as a legitimate way to
respond to people in crisis.38

Perversely, “coercive practices like forced medicalization and
pharmaceutical interventions often transpire under the guise of
evidence-based practice,” notwithstanding ample evidence to the
contrary.39 Clinician groups, including the World Psychiatric
Association, have questioned the putative benefits of such
approaches.40 In fact, “research has shown that coercive practices
can adversely impact quality of life for people with psychosocial
disabilities, leaving many traumatized and disempowered.”41 This
holds true even for “crisis” or “emergency” mental health care.
NURSING 317 (2013); Cynthia Robins et al., Special Section on Seclusion and Restraint:
Consumers Perceptions of Negative Experiences and “Sanctuary Harm” in Psychiatric
Settings, 56 PSYCH. SERV. 1134 (2005).
37. S.P. Sashidharan et al., Reducing Coercion in Mental Healthcare, 28 EPIDEMIOLOGY
& PSYCHIATRIC SCI., 605, 605-06 (2019).
38. Michelle Funk et al., Strategies to Achieve a Rights-Based Approach through WHO
QualityRights, in MENTAL HEALTH, LEGAL CAPACITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 245 (Michael Ashley
Stein et al. eds., 2021).
39. Barsky et al., supra note 34, at 32 (collecting studies); see also Council of Europe,
supra note 30, ¶ 2 (signaling “the lack of empirical evidence regarding . . . the effectiveness
of coercive measures in preventing self-harm or harm to others”).
40. Faraaz Mahomed et al., Compulsory Mental Health Interventions and the CRPD:
Minding Equality by Anna Nilsson (Review), 43 HUM. RTS Q. 616, 616-20 (2021).
41. Barsky et al., supra note 34, at 32 (collecting studies). See also Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard
of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/21 (Mar. 28, 2017) [hereinafter
SRPMH Report 2017] (“Justification for using coercion is generally based on ‘medical
necessity’ and ‘dangerousness.’ These subjective principles are not supported by research
and their application is open to broad interpretation, raising questions of arbitrariness.”).
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Increasingly, there is evidence that non-coercive, communitybased crisis services can deliver the desired outcomes in assisting
people during crisis situations.42 Moreover, power asymmetries
dissuade “people from seeking further treatment thus increasing
the risk of non-adherence and involuntary treatment, particularly
those with long-term mental health problems.”43 Thus, the
persistence of “paternalistic and coercive practices” is “one of
many paradoxes in mental health practice.”44
For example, the global mental health community has rejected
nontherapeutic uses of mind-altering substances.45 While current
international legal standards permit therapeutic psychotropic
drugs under certain conditions, their nontherapeutic
applications—namely, to punish or coerce persons rather than to
treat mental health conditions—have been widely repudiated.46
Because they lack therapeutic justification, such applications of
psychotropic drugs are commonly referred to not as “treatment,”
but as “chemical restraints.”47 Accordingly, the UN has prohibited
mental health workers from using antipsychotic drugs “as a
punishment or for the convenience of others.”48 Other
42. Gooding et al., supra note 31.
43. Barsky et al., supra note 34, at 33 (quoting S.P. Sashidharan et al., supra note 37).
See also SRPMH Report 2017, supra note 41, ¶ 65 (“Coercion in psychiatry perpetuates
power imbalances in care relationships, causes mistrust, exacerbates stigma and
discrimination and has made many turn away, fearful of seeking help within mainstream
mental health services.”).
44. Barsky et al., supra note 34, at 32-33.
45. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4)(ii) (specifically mentioning “mind altering
substances” as a cause of severe prolonged harm that may constitute torture).
46. See, e.g., SRT Interim Report 2008, supra note 22, ¶ 63 (“Inside institutions, as
well as in the context of forced outpatient treatment, psychiatric medication, including
neuroleptics and other mind-altering drugs, may be administered to persons with mental
disabilities without their free and informed consent or against their will, under coercion,
or as a form of punishment. The administration in detention and psychiatric institutions
of drugs, including neuroleptics that cause trembling, shivering and contractions and make
the subject apathetic and dull his or her intelligence, has been recognized as a form of
torture.”) (citing Pieter Kooijmans (Special Rapporteur on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, ¶ 119 (Feb. 19,
1986)).
47. CPT Standards, supra note 22, at 2; see also Fennell, supra note 21, at 444
(discussing how the relevance that absence of therapeutic purpose has for torture
analysis).
48. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the
Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/119 (1991);
see also Fennell, supra note 21, at 449 (positing that the principle prohibiting
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international bodies have adopted this bright-line rule.49
Recognizing this broad understanding, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Torture has urged states to ban chemical restraints in
institutional settings.50 Critical to the Special Rapporteur’s
determination was the inherent powerlessness of psychiatric
patients in such settings and the impunity with which mental
health workers in many countries can administer psychotropic
drugs non-therapeutically.51
This focus on the torturous nature of chemical restraints
coincides with a broader movement away from using coercive
measures in mental health settings, regardless of the purported
therapeutic aims of mental health workers.52 More recently, the
Special Rapporteur has signaled that coercive practices, including
nonconsensual intrusive and irreversible treatments may also apply to “psychotropic
medication administered without consent . . . electro convulsive therapy (ECT), restraint,
physical and chemical, and seclusion or solitary confinement).
49. See, e.g., CPT Standards, supra note 22, at 2 (“Means of restraint should never be
used as punishment, for the mere convenience of staff, because of staff shortages or to
replace proper care or treatment.”) (referring collectively to physical, mechanical, and
chemical restraints); Mental Health and Prisons, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L COMM. RED
CROSS,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220306221453/www.who.int/mental_health/policy/m
h_in_prison.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2022) (describing abusive use of medications as
torture). See also SRT Interim Report 2008 supra note 22, at 47 (citing “lack [of]
therapeutic purpose” as indicia of torture); see also Statement by Mr. Dainius Pūras, Special
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health (July 3, 2020) (noting the “limited effectiveness of psychotropic
medications,” the scientific literature’s role in having “downplayed” their side effects, and
that
their
overuse
“risks
legitimizing
coercive
practices”),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2020/10/statement-mr-dainius-puras-specialrapporteur-right-everyone-enjoyment-highest [https://perma.cc/ER7C-XPKZ] (last
visited Apr. 28, 2022).
50. SRT Report 2013, supra note 22, ¶¶ 63, 89(b). See also Rep. of the UN High
Comm’r for Human Rights, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/32 (Jan. 31, 2017) (signaling that
“the use of restraints, forced medication and overmedication” may constitute torture); U.N.
Comm. on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 2, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc.
CRPD/C/GC/1 (May 19, 2014) (declaring that coercive mental health measures, such as
restraints, may constitute torture).
51. SRT Report 2013, supra note 22, at ¶¶ 63-64 (describing their use as
“systematic”).
52. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/48
(Apr. 15, 2020) (urging a “radical shift away from coercion” in mental health systems); see
also SRPMH Report 2017, supra note 41, ¶¶ 10, 25, 29, 64 (citing growing body of research
questioning the efficacy of coercive measures).
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“psychiatric intervention on the grounds of ‘medical necessity’ or
the ‘best interests’ of the patient . . . may well amount to torture”
because they “generally involve highly discriminatory and coercive
attempts at controlling or ‘correcting’ the victim’s personality,
behaviour or choices and almost always inflict severe pain or
suffering.”53 Especially relevant to institutional mental health
settings, where coercive practices are known to propagate, is the
Special Rapporteur’s call to reframe torture inquiries to focus not
just on whether “isolated techniques” are severe and intentional
enough to constitute torture, but also to consider environmental
factors, such as the institutional nature of many mental health
settings.54 Because people “tend to experience . . . torture
holistically,” the contexts in which specific, harmful acts occur
matter for determining CAT violations.55 This reframing builds on
previous efforts to distinguish torture from other forms of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment based on the “powerlessness” of
the victim, rather than merely the severity of harm caused.56 In
other words, context matters, and the risk of torture increases
when members of historically marginalized groups are placed
involuntarily into vulnerable situations.57

53. Nils Melzer (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Report of the Special Rapporteur to the Human
Rights Council Forty-Third Session, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/49 (Mar. 20, 2020)
[hereinafter SRT Report 2020].
54. Id. ¶ 70.
55. Id.
56. SRT Interim Report 2008, supra note 22, ¶¶ 27–76; see also Rep. of the Office of
the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Expert Seminar on Freedom from Torture and Ill-Treatment
and
Persons
with
Disabilities
(Dec.
11,
2007),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/torture/seminartorturereportfi
nal.doc [https://perma.cc/FA2C-3CT2].
57. See Committee Against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017) on the
Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/GC/4 ¶ 17 (Sep. 4, 2018) [hereinafter CAT Committee] (“The Committee considers
that severe pain or suffering cannot always be assessed objectively. It depends on the
negative physical and/or mental repercussions that the infliction of violent or abusive acts
has on each individual, taking into account all relevant circumstances of each case,
including the nature of the treatment, the sex, age and state of health and vulnerability of
the victim and any other status or factors.”).
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III. CAT CLAIM ELEMENTS
IJs act as frontline sentries in discharging the United States’
non-refoulement duty. As administrative judges within the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), IJs serve as the first-instance triersof-fact in removal proceedings and issue initial decisions on
respondents with psychosocial disabilities’ CAT claims. Their
decisions are appealable to the BIA,58 and BIA decisions are
appealable to the federal Circuit Court of Appeals in which the IJ
resides. Published BIA decisions are binding on all Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) officers and IJs unless the Attorney
General59 or a federal court modifies or overrules them.
Under FARRA, CAT relief is mandatory, unlike asylum, which
is discretionary.60 CAT relief comes in the form of either
withholding or deferral. Respondents who commit a “particularly
serious crime” are precluded from withholding of removal and are
only eligible for deferral,61 which is more tenuous. Though
withholding grants slightly more durable relief from removal, both
deferral and withholding orders may be revisited in the future,
should conditions in the respondent’s country of origin change
such that removal without refoulement becomes possible.62 Unlike
asylum, neither form of relief affords CAT claimants a pathway to
citizenship or legal permanent resident status, nor does either
form of relief prevent immigration authorities from removing
respondents to third countries where torture is unlikely.63 The
58. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is a federal agency within the
Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).
59. Occasionally, the Attorney General exercises its discretionary authority pursuant
to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i) to refer to itself certain BIA decisions for review.
60. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(4); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 187 n.1
(2013) (noting that the government “has no discretion to deny relief to a noncitizen who
establishes his eligibility” for CAT relief).
61. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)-(d) (2021) (withholding of removal under section
241(b)(3)(B) of the Act and withholding of removal under the Convention Against
Torture.); id. at § 1208.17(a) (2020) (Deferral of removal under the Convention Against
Torture); see generally EOIR, Fact Sheet: Asylum and Withholding of Removal Relief
Convention
Against
Torture
Protections
8
(Jan.
15,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/AsylumWithholdi
ngCATProtections.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGW9-ULY5] (last visited Apr. 28, 2022)
(describing differences between CAT withholding and deferral).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24(b) (2021) (Termination of asylum or withholding of removal
or deportation); id. at § 1208.17(d) (2021) (Termination of deferral of removal).
63. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(f) (2021).
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primary benefit of CAT relief is avoidance of torture in the
respondent’s country of origin. Consequently, most respondents
also seek other forms of relief, such as asylum64 or withholding of
removal,65 and IJs generally only adjudicate CAT claims where they
have denied or found respondents ineligible for other forms of
relief.
Under the FARRA regulations, respondents have the burden
of proving that, if removed, they are “more likely than not”66 to
experience severe physical or mental suffering intentionally
inflicted by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official for one of
several proscribed purposes.67 These purposes include: obtaining
information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,68
presumably including disability-based discrimination. Crucially, in
the United States torture is a specific intent crime; therefore,
severe pain or suffering must be specifically intended by the
prospective torturer, as distinct from harms that may be
“unanticipated or unintended.”69 To show that the harm they fear
qualifies as torture, respondents must satisfy each of these
64. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2021); see generally Janet E. Lord et al., Advancing Disability
Rights-Based Refugee and Asylum Claims, VA. INT’L L.J., (forthcoming) (discussing asylum
claims by noncitizens with disabilities).
65. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2021).
66. Id. at §§ 1208.16(c)(2) & 17(a). This threshold appears to exceed the “substantial
grounds” standard set by Article 3 of the CAT. See CAT, supra note 2, art. 3. Some
adjudicators believe that evidence showing that torturous conduct is “routine, widespread,
horrific, and officially tolerated” should be sufficient, because “[f]ew, if any, prospective
torture victims will be able to provide ‘statistical proof’ of a ‘50.001% chance’ of torture.”
Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 308 (B.I.A. 2002) (Schmidt, dissenting); contra id. at 303
(appearing to require evidence that torture is “pervasive”). See, e.g., Al-Saher v. INS, 268
F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (remanding in the face of evidence that Iraqi security
forces “routinely” tortured detainees). By contrast, the likelihood of persecution, which
represents less severe harm than torture, required of asylum-seekers is much lower than
fifty percent. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (rejecting a “clear
probability” of future persecution standard for asylum-seekers and suggesting that a one
in ten chance of future persecution may be sufficient) (quoting ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1966)). As a matter of policy, it is
counterintuitive that the threshold for relief from less egregious harms than torture should
be lower than for CAT claims.
67. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2021).
68. See id. These proscribed purposes are enumerated in the CAT itself. CAT, supra
note 2, art. 1(1).
69. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5) (2021).
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elements of a CAT claim—the harm must be severe, be specifically
intended, have direct or indirect government involvement, and be
done for a proscribed purpose. We describe each of these in greater
detail in the sections below, before turning to how IJs apply these
elements to noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities’ CAT claims
regarding harms in mental health settings in Part IV.
A. Severe Pain or Suffering
Pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, must be severe.
For purely mental pain and suffering, the harm must be prolonged
and may result from the intentional or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration of (or
threatened administration of) mind-altering substances or other
procedures calculated to profoundly disrupt the senses or the
personality.70 Substandard mental health care alone does not
constitute torture.71 The United States has not adopted more
nuanced approaches to defining torture. For example, IJs need not
alter their severe harm analysis based on the victim’s position of
“powerlessness” with respect to the torturer.72 Similarly, IJs need
not expressly look to environmental factors to adduce severe
harm.73 As we discuss in Part IV, IJs are much more likely to
interpret environmental factors as disqualifying certain harmful
conduct as torture.
70. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(4) (2021). Inhumane conditions and lack of access to
appropriate medical care do not, in and of themselves, constitute torture, although the
intentional denial of medical care does rise to the level of torture under CAT. Cole v. Holder,
659 F.3d 762, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Eneh v. Holder, 601 F.3d 943, 948 (2010)).
71. See Raffington v. Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2005).
72. The UN Special Rapporteur has signaled that rather than severity of harm, “the
decisive criteria for distinguishing torture from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
may best be understood to be the purpose of the conduct and the powerlessness of the
victim, rather than the intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted.” Manfred Nowak (Special
Rapporteur on Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment),
Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention. ¶ 39, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/6 (Dec. 23, 2005); see also SRT Report 2020, supra note 53, at ¶¶ 40, 69
(recognizing disability and disability-related rights restrictions may contribute to
powerlessness); SRT Interim Report 2008, supra note 22, at ¶ 50.
73. SRT Report 2020, supra note 53, at ¶ 86 (exhorting that the “intentionality,
purposefulness and severity of the inflicted pain or suffering must always be assessed as a
whole and in the light of the circumstances prevailing in the given environment”). Instead,
as will be discussed in Part IV, they tend to use environmental factors strictly as
exculpatory evidence.
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B. Specific Intent
Harm must be intentionally inflicted. The United States’
understanding of the CAT’s intent requirement74 requires specific
intent to exclude acts resulting in “unanticipated and unintended”
suffering.75 Instead, “for an act to constitute torture, there must be
a showing that the actor had the intent to commit the act as well as
the intent to achieve the consequences of the act.”76 Although the
UN Committee Against Torture (“CAT Committee”) has never
“considered it necessary to conduct an intent analysis separate
from its examination of these facts and circumstances” regarding
torturers’ motives,77 the FARRA regulations describe it as a
discrete element of CAT claims.78
US courts have repeatedly upheld the FARRA regulations’
requirement of specific intent,79 even though some scholars have
argued that this sets a higher bar on CAT claimants than the
express terms of the CAT itself.80 Prominently, in Villegas v.
74. See 136 CONG. REC. S36193 (1990) (“[T]he United States understands that, in
order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering.”) (emphasis added).
75. CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. REP. NO. 101-30, at 14 (1990); see also Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 482, 484 (B.I.A. 2018) (citing Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002))
(“‘[T]orture’ does not cover ‘negligent acts’ or harm stemming from a lack of resources.”).
76. Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming Matter of J-E-,
23 I. & N. Dec.); see also Pierre v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (affirming Auguste, 395 F.3d) (citing Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir.
2007)).
77. Oona A. Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent to Torture under
International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 796 (2012).
78. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5) (2021).
79. See, e.g., Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that
“[e]very other circuit to consider the question has concluded that ‘torture’ under the CAT
requires specific intent to inflict harm”); Auguste, 395 F.3d at 143 (rejecting the
petitioner’s contention “that the United States’ understanding of Article 1 of the
Convention as requiring ‘specific intent’ is inconsistent with the Convention”); Matter of JR-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 485 (collecting cases).
80. See Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection
Under the Convention Against Torture, 88 ORE. L. REV. 777, 779 (2009) (criticizing the BIA’s
“misguided approach to CAT protection that creates an insurmountable obstacle to
actually obtaining such protection”). See also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES § 7:26 (2021 ed.) (citing KEES WOUTERS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR
THE PROTECTION FROM REFOULEMENT 443 (2009) (“The term ‘intentionally’ refers not just to
the specific intent, but also to the so-called ‘general intent, whereby the torturer knows
that a certain conduct will cause severe pain or suffering, even though that is not
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Mukasey, which involved a noncitizen of Mexican origin diagnosed
with “severe bipolar disorder,”81 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed what the FARRA regulations and the United States’ CAT
understanding had already made clear: CAT claimants must prove
would-be torturers’ specific intent to inflict severe harm, which
requires more than showing severe harm was merely
“foreseeable.”82
How much more is uncertain, though, in part because US
courts have not consistently delimited the dividing line between
specific and general intent.83 The ”uniquely prospective” nature of
specific intent inquiries in removal proceedings compounds this
ambiguity.84 Adjudicators may infer intent from circumstantial
evidence.85 For example, in cases involving Haiti’s blanket

necessarily his objective.’”); Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday:
Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 325 (1994) (“The intent
required under the international torture conventions is simply the general intent to do the
act which clearly or foreseeably causes terrible suffering.”). But see Hathaway et al., supra
note 77, at 795 (concluding that in effect the proscribed purpose element of CAT claims
“renders torture a specific intent crime under international law”).
81. Villegas, 523 F.3d at 985.
82. Id. at 988.
83. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to James B. Comey,
Deputy Att’y Gen., on Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, at 16
(Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memo] (“It is well recognized that the term ‘specific
intent’ is ambiguous and that the courts do not use it consistently.”) (citing 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e), at 355 n.79 (2d ed. 2003)); see also id. at 16-17
(noting that some US courts “suggest that only a conscious desire to produce the
proscribed result constitutes specific intent; others suggest that even reasonable
foreseeability suffices” and concluding he “d[id] not believe it is useful to try to define the
precise meaning of ‘specific intent’” because “it would not be appropriate to rely on parsing
the specific intent element of the statute to approve as lawful conduct that might otherwise
amount to torture”).
84. Hathaway et al., supra note 77, at 812 (attributing IJs’ “stricter approach to proof
of intent to torture” to the speculation inherent to assessing the mental state of future
torturers). See also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007) (acknowledging
“the difficulties that might arise in applying that standard to evidence of country
conditions in order to predict the likelihood of future events in individual cases”).
85. Pierre, 502 F.3d at 118; Guerra v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2020)
(approving an IJ’s use of “evidence of primitive and abusive practices on mental health
patients . . . to support an inference of specific intent to inflict harm”), amended by Guerra
v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2020); Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 917 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“If it is true that the . . . government has a policy of placing accused human rights violators
in charge of prisoners, as the IJ found it does, then there is nothing illogical in inferring the
government intends to put those prisoners at risk of cruel, abusive treatment that would
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detention policies for criminal deportees, courts have sought
evidence of targeting individuals as indicia of specific intent.86
Even so, some courts uphold grants of CAT relief where IJs find in
the first instance that government actors deliberately use
detention facilities to harm inmates.87
C. Government Involvement
Harm must be inflicted either by a government actor or with
the government’s acquiescence. Harm by private actors, no matter
how severe, does not warrant CAT relief unless the government
was, at minimum, willfully ignorant of the private conduct.88 The
conduct of low-level government actors is sufficient to prove
acquiescence; it need not occur at the highest levels of
government.89 Proof of government acquiescence should not
generally be required where government actors are the putative
torturers, although in practice, as we describe in Part IV, this is
often not the case even with regard to mental health workers
employed in state-run psychiatric facilities. Indeed, immigration
adjudicators often appear to conflate the specific intent and
government acquiescence elements of CAT claims.
D. Proscribed Purpose
Harm must be inflicted for a proscribed purpose. Such
purposes include: to obtain information or a confession; to punish,
qualify as ‘severe suffering’ or ‘torture’—as the IJ found.”); Coronel Resendiz v. Barr, 810
F. App’x 538, 540-41 (9th Cir. 2020).
86. Hathaway et al., supra note 77, at 817-19 (discussing cases).
87. Ridore, 696 F.3d at 917 (faulting the BIA for having “summarily rejected (or
ignored) the [ IJs’] findings”); see also Guerra v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128, 1136-37 (9th Cir.
2020), amended by Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Ridore, 696
F.3d at 918-19).
88. Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705-06 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Government
acquiescence does not require actual knowledge or willful acceptance of torture;
awareness and willful blindness will suffice.”).
89. See Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasizing
that “high-level government efforts, however important and laudable, do not necessarily
reflect low-level government actors on the ground”); Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499,
509-10 (9th Cir. 2013) (asserting that “corruption of public officials in Mexico remains a
problem, particularly at the state and local levels of government,” and that the actions of
low-level officials, even when acting in contravention of the country’s will, may be
sufficient to show government acquiescence for the purposes of CAT relief).
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intimidate, or coerce them; or for any reason relating to
discrimination.90 Although proscribed purpose is a distinct
element from intent for CAT claims, in practice it “is closely linked
to, perhaps even subsumed by, the interpretation of the specific
intent requirement.”91 “Evidence showing an illicit purpose may
easily overlap with evidence showing a specific intent to inflict
severe pain or suffering.”92 Indeed, some have argued that
evidence of proscribed purpose effectively satisfies the specific
intent requirement under US law.93 Because of the proximity of the
intent and purpose elements, “the purpose requirement has not
been significantly elaborated in US case law. Rather, decisionmakers typically recite the statutory language without distinct
analysis of the purpose requirement.”94 Indeed, as we describe in
Part IV, none of the forty-nine IJ decisions we reviewed contained
a proscribed purpose analysis as distinct from specific intent.
IV. HOW IJS APPLY CAT ELEMENTS
As previously noted, IJs are the frontline of implementing the
United States’ non-refoulement obligations. To better understand
how IJs interpret the FARRA regulations, we reviewed a
nonrepresentative sample of forty-nine unpublished IJ decisions
between 2016 and 2021 from California (n=35), Colorado (n=4),
New York (n=1), Washington (n=2), and Virginia (n=7) that denied
90. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2021).
91. ANKER, supra note 80, § 7:27. For example, the Pierre Court apparently considered
evidence that the harmful consequences of detention for a Haitian with esophageal
dysphasia were “unfortunate but unintended” as negating the proscribed purpose
element. 528 F.3d at 189 (“We find that this unintended consequence is not the type of
proscribed purpose contemplated by the CAT.”). See also id. at 190 (holding that
“petitioner cannot obtain relief under the CAT unless he can show that his prospective
torturer will have the goal or purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering”).
92. Pierre, 502 F.3d at 119 n.8.
93. Hathaway et al., supra note 77, at 820 (“In the immigration jurisprudence, the U.S.
courts' interpretation of the intent standard for torture mirrors the approach adopted by
U.S. courts in other contexts and by international bodies: The specific intent requirement
for torture is met by evidence that pain or suffering will be knowingly inflicted on an
individual for a proscribed purpose.”).
94. ANKER, supra note 80, § 7:27. As an example of the proximity of these two
elements, the Villegas Court apparently elided the phrases "specific intent” and
“proscribed purpose” where it found “nothing indicat[ing] that Mexican officials . . . created
these conditions for the specific purpose of inflicting suffering upon the patients.” 523 F.3d
at 989.
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CAT claims by noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities. We
obtained these decisions through personal communications with
the attorneys and organizations who provided representation in
these cases. Below, we outline their broad characteristics, before
analyzing in detail trends in how IJs have resolved each of the four
main elements of CAT claims.
A. Forty-Nine IJ Decisions
Twenty-four different IJs delivered the forty-nine decisions,
although one judge accounted for fifteen of them. Because these
are unpublished decisions, we assigned each a unique number.95
We use these identifiers in place of case names in the sections that
follow. Although we intentionally limited our review to CAT relief
denials, it bears noting that some respondents with psychosocial
disabilities do prevail.96 We note that some grants of CAT relief
appear to misapply the relevant standards in ways similar to those
we describe in the forty-nine denials we reviewed;97 nevertheless,
we primarily concerned ourselves with denials because the
consequences of erroneous denials are dire, both in terms of the
United States’ duty to fulfill its international obligations and the
human cost of exposing individuals to significant risk of severe
harm.
Most cases (n=30) involved respondents of Mexican origin,
but they also included persons from El Salvador (n=6), Guatemala
(n=6), and Guinea (n=2), with one case apiece involving
respondents with origins in Brazil, Egypt, Honduras, Kenya, and
Nicaragua. All but one of the respondents were male. Several
identified as LGBTQ (n=4). All but one of the respondents was
deemed incompetent to represent themselves and therefore
appointed a qualified representative pursuant to Matter of
M-A-M-.98
95. See infra Table 1.
96. Indeed, we also obtained a smaller number (n=4) of IJ decisions granting CAT
relief in addition to the 49 denials.
97. For example, in the IJ decision that led to Matter of R-A-F-, the IJ analyzed whether
the Mexican government acquiesced to harms committed mental health workers
employed in state-run psychiatric hospitals. 27 I. & N. Dec. 778 (A.G. 2020).
98. 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (B.I.A. 2011). Because the CAT claim of the respondent in Case
No. 31 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020) was denied only after the BIA reversed a grant of withholding
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The most common diagnosis among respondents was
schizophrenia (n=19), followed, respectively, by depressive
disorders (n=12), neurocognitive disorders or intellectual
disabilities (n=11), post-traumatic stress disorder or unspecified
trauma (n=10), bipolar disorders (n=9), anxiety disorders (n=8),
and schizoaffective disorder (n=6). Most respondents (n=29) had
received more than one formal diagnosis from a psychiatrist,
psychologist, or licensed clinical social worker, while several (n=6)
based their claims on symptoms, such as hallucinations, that
suggested psychosocial disabilities while lacking formal
diagnoses.99
Most respondents’ CAT claims focused primarily on feared
harms relating to their psychosocial disabilities, although for some
these fears appeared subsidiary to their fear of other kinds of
harm. Respondents’ fears of psychosocial disability generally
centered on inpatient mental health facilities and carceral settings.
Respondents with substance abuse disorders (n=9) also feared
harm in rehabilitation facilities. Some respondents also feared
harm unrelated to their psychosocial disabilities, including harm
due to gang violence (n=18) or their LGBTQ identity (n=4),
religious beliefs (n=3), or political views (n=2). Most (n=29)
respondents engaged experts to provide country conditions
evidence through written or live testimony.
Several precedents were repeatedly cited by IJs in support of
their denials, namely, Villegas v. Mukasey, Matter of J-F-F-, Matter of
J-E-, and Matter of J-R-G-P-.100 Villegas was the most frequently
cited and discussed in greatest detail, as measured by the number
of citations within each decision. But Villegas was only cited by the
thirty-seven decisions from IJs under the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeal’s jurisdiction; among the twelve decisions from other
jurisdictions, Villegas was only cited in Case No. 44 (I.J. Dec. Apr.
2021).101 By contrast, J-F-F-, J-E-, and J-R-G-P- were cited frequently
of removal under section 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, see 8
CFR § 208.16(b), the IJ’s decision does not specify whether his counsel was appointed
pursuant to an incompetency determination.
99. See infra Table 1 for more detail.
100. See infra Table 2.
101. Case No. 44, at 9 (I.J. Dec. Apr., 2021) (collecting Circuit Court specific intent
holdings).
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across jurisdictions. J-R-G-P- was cited in twenty-six of thirty-two
cases decided after October 31, 2018.102 Matter of R-A-F- was also
cited in seven of eighteen cases decided after February 26, 2020.103
Recent cases have cited J-E- more frequently than older cases,
despite J-E- being the oldest of these BIA and Attorney General
decisions. However, as we describe in greater detail below, many
IJs appear to misinterpret these precedents to the detriment of
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities claiming CAT protection.
In 39 cases, IJs found that respondents had failed to satisfy
more than one element of their CAT claims. Most frequently, IJs
cited insufficient evidence of the specific intent element (n=47).
Although likelihood of torture was the second-most common
ground for CAT relief denial (n=38), we do not describe this aspect
of IJs’ decisions given the highly fact-specific nature of these
inquiries and IJs’ duty to aggregate the likelihood of multiple
prospective sources of torture.104 Only ten IJs dismissed CAT
claims based on a failure to show just one element of their claims,
eight of which were on specific intent grounds, and two on
likelihood grounds. Many IJs also found that respondents failed to
show sufficient government involvement (n=30), although these
analyses were often not distinct from specific intent analyses, as
we describe below. IJs rarely questioned whether the harms feared
by CAT claimants failed to satisfy the severity element; indeed,
several IJs expressly recognized that the harms they feared likely
did satisfy that element.105 Finally, consistent with immigration
102. See infra Table 3.
103. See infra Table 3.
104. Thus, CAT claimants need not show that they will more likely than not be
tortured in institutional mental health settings; rather, they may show that the probability
of mental health-related torture, when combined with the probability of other forms of
torture, such as by gang members or law enforcement officers, is greater than fifty percent.
See Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Guerra v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128
(9th Cir. 2020), amended by Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2020); Resendiz v.
Barr, 810 Fed. Appx. 538, 540 (9th Cir. 2020).
105. See, e.g., Case No. 4, at 20 (I.J. Dec. July 22, 2016) (conceding “there is a risk of
treatment that can be considered to11ure if Respondent would be institutionalized in one
of these institutions”); Case No. 7, at 5 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21, 2017) & Case No. 9, at 7 (I.J. Dec.
Nov. 27, 2017) (acknowledging that “abusive practices, such as isolation, prolonged
physical restraints, lobotomies, and electroconvulsive therapy, to control and constrain
their actions…could rise to the level of torture”); Case No. 10, at 22 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 7, 2018)
(“recogniz[ing] that some harms faced by patients in public psychiatric institutions may
rise to the level of severe pain or suffering”); Case No. 24, at 22 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019)
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adjudicators’ practice noted above,106 IJs never directly analyzed
the proscribed purpose element of CAT claims.
Below, we describe in greater detail our findings regarding IJs’
specific intent analyses of CAT claims given the prominent role this
element plays in their decisions. We discern several themes. First,
there is a lack of uniformity among IJs as to the appropriate unit
for their specific intent analyses: some IJs focused on the intent of
governmental entities instead of that of the would-be torturers,
namely, individual mental health workers. Additionally, among IJs
that did address the intent of individual mental health workers,
some also performed apparently extraneous government
acquiescence analyses, despite seeming to acknowledge that
mental health workers are public officials, which largely resemble
specific intent analyses of governmental entities. Finally, no IJs
appeared to consider evidence describing individual mental health
workers’ goal of controlling mental health patients as probative of
the proscribed purpose “coercion”; instead, they tended either to
overlook mental health workers’ coercive aims or to consider them
as undercutting specific intent.
B. Intent of Governmental Entities
There are two distinct approaches for how IJs approach
specific intent analyses. The first, which we discuss in this section,
focuses on whether governmental entities writ large specifically
intended to cause harm.107 When IJs focus on the intent of
governments writ large, they tended to overlook unique harms
that individual workers in institutional mental health settings may
cause. Within this approach, we discerned two sub-themes, which
we address in turn. First, some IJs appeared to require that CAT
claimants show that governmental entities intentionally created
(finding that “the record reflects abusive practices in such facilities that may rise to the
level of torture”); Case No. 34, at 11 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 4, 2020) (acknowledging "that torture
occurs in mental institutions in Mexico”); Case No. 49, at 9 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 29, 2021)
(concluding “that this evidence overwhelmingly illustrates harm rising to the level of
torture within Mexican mental health institutions”). But see Case No. 1, at 50 (I.J. Dec. Mar.
14, 2016) (finding “no evidence that merely administering high dosages of psychotropic
medication would cause severe pain or suffering when properly monitored”).
106. See discussion supra Section III.C.
107. The other approach, which focuses on the mental state of individual mental
health workers, is discussed infra in Section IV.D.
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and maintained deplorable conditions in mental health facilities to
harm patients. Second, some IJs perceived record evidence of
either scarce resources or negligent operation and oversight of
mental health facilities not as circumstantial evidence that may
support inferences of specific intent,108 but rather as affirmative
defenses that ended their specific intent analyses. Both of these
sub-themes appear to derive from questionable interpretations of
relevant legal precedents.
1. Intent to Create Deplorable Conditions
When IJs focused on governmental entities’ intent, they
generally required evidence that governments intentionally
maintained deplorable conditions inside inpatient mental health
facilities for the purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on
patients. Many, such as Case No. 40, refer to Matter of J-E- for the
proposition that the respondent must show that the government
“intentionally and deliberately creat[es] and maintain[s]”
conditions inside mental health or other facilities.109 As a result,
they focused less on the conduct of individual actors in those
facilities and more on the general conditions.110 Intuitively,
systemic issues lend themselves to systemic explanations, as the IJ
in Case No. 43 demonstrated: “the substandard conditions in
Mexico’s mental health and penal facilities are more likely ‘the
result of neglect, lack of resources, or insufficient training and
education,’ rather than a specific intent to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering.”111
This may stem in part from respondents’ framing of country
conditions. For example, per the IJ in Case No. 13, “Respondent has
argued that the conditions inside the mental health institutions
alone, sponsored by the government of Mexico, are enough to find
108. Guerra v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2020), amended by Guerra v. Barr, 974
F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2020).
109. See, e.g., Case No. 40, at 17 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13, 2021).
110. See, e.g., id. at 20 (concluding “the Respondent cannot show the conditions in
Federico Mora Hospital constitute torture within the meaning of the CAT and precedential
Board cases” while underplaying individual harmful acts “of physical, sexual, and
psychological mistreatment and violence” therein).
111. Case No. 43, at 13 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 29, 2021) (quoting Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 482, 486-87 (B.I.A. 2019) and also citing Matter of R-A-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778, 778 (A.G.
2020)).
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that the government of Mexico engages in cruel and tortuous
behavior towards mentally ill individuals.”112 To the extent the IJ
faithfully represented the respondent’s claim, the claim is
inapposite: as noted above, both the FARRA regulations and
numerous BIA and circuit court precedents clearly indicate that
CAT claims require proving that prospective torturers specifically
intend to inflict severe pain or suffering.113
IJs’ focus on conditions also appears to be more informed by
an interpretation of Matter of J-E- that to show specific intent CAT
claimants must prove that governmental authorities “intentionally
and deliberately create[] and maintain” substandard conditions in
institutional settings “in order to inflict torture.”114 There, the
respondent had claimed that Haitian authorities had a practice of
indefinitely detaining criminal deportees in inhumane conditions.
Although the divided BIA panel (13-7) recognized that “Haitian
authorities are intentionally detaining criminal deportees knowing
that the detention facilities are substandard,”115 it held that the
respondent was required to show further that the Haitian
authorities did so for a proscribed purpose, which the record
evidence did not support.116 Following the panel’s reasoning, a
showing that Haitian authorities knowingly detained criminal
deportees in substandard facilities for a proscribed purpose may
have satisfied the FARRA regulations’ specific intent requirement.
The BIA observed that even if the respondent were to have
shown specific intent, he would also have had to prove the Haitian
authorities had a proscribed purpose, which the record evidence
did not support.117 The BIA did not dispute that “[t]he evidence
establishes that isolated acts of torture occur in Haitian detention
facilities,” including acts such as “burning with cigarettes, choking,
hooding, kalot marassa, and electric shocks.”118 However, it ruled
112. Case No. 13, at 21 (I.J. Dec. May 14, 2018). See also Case No. 16, at 21 (I.J. Dec.
Aug. 10, 2018); Case No. 18, at 23 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4, 2018); Case No. 19, at 18 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2018).
113. See discussion supra at Section III.B.
114. Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002).
115. Id. at 301 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 300 (citing Haiti’s legitimate security interests).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 302. “Kalot marassa” refers to “severe boxing of the ears, which can result
in eardrum damage.” Id. at 301.
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that the respondent “failed to establish that these severe instances
of mistreatment are so pervasive as to establish a probability that
a person detained in a Haitian prison will be subject to torture.”119
Thus, even though IJs frequently cite Matter of J-E- for the
proposition that a specific intent showing requires proving that
authorities “are intentionally and deliberately creating and
maintaining such prison conditions in order to inflict torture,” the
case’s holding was arguably more limited, and in fact, signaled that
specifically intended acts inside detention facilities may constitute
torture, even if governmental entities lack torturous intent for
detaining people.120
This prevailing interpretation of Matter of J-E- appears to lead
many IJs to limit their specific intent inquiries to whether
governmental entities intentionally use deplorable detention
facilities to harm patients therein, thereby ignoring whether
indisputably intentional, harmful acts inside mental health
facilities satisfy the specific intent element for CAT relief.121 While
such a standard may be warranted for records devoid of evidence
of specific forms of coercive mental health care, in the cases we
reviewed, the IJs appeared to acknowledge these acts but declined
to give them much weight based on Matter of J-E-.
2. Government Negligence or Resource Scarcity
Relatedly, some IJs considered evidence of historical
governmental negligence or resource scarcities to obviate specific
intent to inflict severe harm. Generally, instead of expressly calling
for evidence that governmental entities intentionally use mental
health facilities to harm patients, these IJs appear to reason that
119. Id. at 304 (contrasting this case with Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.
2001), where “the record indicated that the security services routinely tortured detainees
and that Iraqi refugees often reported instances of torture”) (emphasis original).
120. Id. at 301 (B.I.A. 2002).
121. See, e.g., A-E-R-, AXXX XXX 231 (B.I.A Nov. 12, 2021) (unpublished) (concluding
that the IJ “appears to have conflated the concept of "deplorable conditions" in mental
institutions as a result of neglect, a lack of resources, or insufficient training and education,
as discussed in cases such as Villegas and Matter of J-R-G-P-, with the respondent's claim
and evidence, including expert opinions, that Salvadoran personnel intentionally and
affirmatively use involuntary electroconvulsive therapy, prolonged physical restraints,
and physical and sexual abuse with the specific intent of torturing patients”) (internal
citations omitted).
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evidence of systemic or environmental causes for the prevalence
of mental health harms effectively trumps other evidence of
individual acts of coercion by mental health workers.
For example, in Case No. 44 the country conditions expert
specifically “predicted Respondent would be subjected to
mistreatment, abuse, and torture upon his institutionalization.”122
The IJ also noted, “Mexico’s mental health facilities include
indefinite detention, neglect, electro-convulsive therapy (ECT),
over-medication, and, ‘in some extreme cases, long-term use of
restraints,’” and a 2019 report on four facilities “detailed the use of
cages, isolation rooms, prolonged restraints, and rape.”123
Elsewhere, the IJ noted the expert’s testimony that she had
observed ECT applications “for behavior modification or as
punishment for bad or uncooperative behavior, not as
treatment.”124 Nevertheless, the IJ reasoned that the expert’s
testimony and record evidence merely
reflects widespread deficiencies in healthcare access,
resources, training, and education in mental health treatment.
Significantly, [the expert] herself testified that the lack of
mental health resources in Mexico is due to “social
abandonment,” which lacks the requisite specific intent.125

Citing Matter of J-R-G-P- and Matter of R-A-F-, the IJ found that
record evidence of resource scarcity coupled with societal neglect
negated the undisputed expert testimony and recent
documentation by firsthand investigators detailing specific
harmful acts.126 But the IJ failed to explain how acts such as overmedication or prolonged application of restraints either were not
sufficiently intentional or did not cause severe harm. Instead, the
IJ concluded that “the usage of ECT, restraints, over-medication,
and other abuses, while abhorrent, is the result of inadequate care,
poor training, and limited resources.”127 This conclusion appears
122. Case No. 44, at 11 (I.J. Dec. Apr., 2021).
123. Id. (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 13.
125. Id. at 11-12.
126. Id. at 13 (acknowledging “the harm some individuals experience in Mexico's
mental health institutions,” while concluding “the Record reflects that such harm results
from inadequacies in the country's healthcare infrastructure as a whole”).
127. Id. at 13.
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to imply that challenging environmental factors can defeat specific
intent findings.
Similarly, the IJ in Case No. 47 failed to explain why
environmental factors rendered moot the volitional acts of
individual mental health workers. The IJ acknowledged that some
“individuals are subjected to isolation, psychosurgeries, and
lobotomies.”128 The IJ also noted that “[a]buses of persons with
disabilities included the use of physical and chemical restraints;
physical and sexual abuse; human trafficking, including forced
labor; disappearance; and the illegal adoption of institutionalized
children.”129 The IJ further credited testimony from the
respondent’s country conditions expert, “who has documented
abuses in Mexico for years, reiterated that conditions in Mexican
mental health institutions are plagued by abuses such as long-term
restraints and inadequate care.”130 Yet the IJ concluded “that these
abuses stem from neglect, improper training, and a dearth of
resources.”131 The judge reasoned that the “lack of communitybased services,” “lack of medical care and rehabilitation,” and
absent “habilitation services and behavioral programs,” made
“long-term use of chemical restraints [in mental health facilities]
almost inevitable.”132 Here, the IJ again attributed indisputably
harmful acts to systemic, environmental factors without explaining
why mental health workers’ specific actions were either
insufficiently intentional or harmful. As with Case No. 44, this IJ in
Case No. 47 expected a CAT claimant to prove not only that mental
health workers commit intentional, harmful acts but also that no
other environmental factor is a contributing cause133—a showing
far beyond what the FARRA regulations require.

128. Case No. 47, at 14 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 1, 2021).
129. Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2020 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: MEXICO (Mar. 20, 2021) https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reportson-human-rights-practices/mexico/ [https://perma.cc/9PQ7-7ZAK]).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted).
133. See also Case No. 24, at 23 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019) (reasoning that “[t]he fact
that these facilities may be understaffed and under-resourced does not establish a specific
intent to torture” despite recognizing respondent’s CAT claim was premised on
“intentional conduct by individual actors rather than deplorable conditions”).
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In Case No. 10, the IJ found that conditions in mental health
facilities were not “based on anything more than outdated medical
practice rooted in ‘historical gross negligence and
misunderstanding of the nature of psychiatric illness.’”134 The IJ did
not square this finding with findings regarding specific acts of
mistreatment by mental health workers in the immediately
following paragraph, where she described treatment at
Guatemala’s lone public psychiatric hospital:
One patient at the hospital described the hospital’s treatment
of patients as being motivated out of a desire to punish, rather
than to treat: “Those who refuse their medication are beaten
and put in the ‘little room,’ a barren isolation cell . . . [
d]esperate women sell their bodies for as little as [five]
quetzales, or less than a dollar, to afford basic necessities.”135

Presumably, outdated medical practices do not entirely
account for routine beatings and isolation to coerce patients, to say
nothing of the reported rampant sexual assault—all of which
describe conduct decidedly devoid of therapeutic aims. Yet, this IJ,
as others,136 appeared to consider evidence of governmental
entities’ negligence as foreclosing the possibility of finding that
individual mental health workers might specifically intend to cause
severe harm.
These IJs’ reasoning appears to be related at least in part to a
belief that binding precedent forecloses specific intent findings
where mental health workers operate in environments shaped by
historical governmental negligence or resource scarcity.137 The IJ
134. Case No. 10, at 20 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 7, 2018).
135. Id. at 21.
136. For example, in Case No. 12 (I.J. Dec. May 7, 2018), the respondent’s country
conditions expert testified that “the care institutionalized individuals received is meant to
punish, beating out of them their improper behavior.” Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the IJ
concluded that “Guatemalan officials have the specific intent to harm the patients in these
institutions.” Id. at 16.
137. See also Case No. 31, at 12-13 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020) (quoting Matter of J-R-G-P-,
27 I. & N. Dec. at 484 to support his conclusion that “use of prolonged physical and chemical
restraints, the administration of psychotropic medications, and the application of
electroconvulsive therapy, all without documented clinical necessity, in Mexican
psychiatric facilities,” even though “utilized as a means to control and discipline patients,”
was “not indicative of a specific intent on the part of Mexican authorities,” given “lack of
proper funding and a deficiency of properly trained personnel”) (internal citations
omitted).
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in Case No. 3 apparently considered himself bound by precedent to
find that the Mexican government writ large does not specifically
intend to torture mental health patients:
[I]n Villegas, the Ninth Circuit held that the Mexican
government lacked specific intent with regards to its
treatment of mental patients. While it is true that governmentfunded hospitals and psychiatrists may be considered part of
the Mexican government, the government lacks the specific
intent to harm mental patients as required to constitute
torture under the CAT. Therefore, the deplorable conditions at
a psychiatric hospital that may be experienced by Respondent
do not rise to the level of torture[.]138

In contrast with other sections of the same IJ’s CAT claim
analysis pertaining to other prongs, here, the IJ referenced no
factual evidence from the record in support of his conclusory
statement that the government lacked the specific intent to harm
mental patients. Indeed, this passage suggests that the IJ
considered Villegas to foreclose a finding of specific intent,
regardless of the evidence that the record may have contained
regarding specific acts by mental health workers that cause severe
pain or suffering.
In fact, Villegas Court did not so hold. Rather, Villegas held
what the plain language of 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(a)(1) & (5), read
together, expressly state: “that to establish a likelihood of torture
for purposes of the CAT, a petitioner must show that severe pain
or suffering was specifically intended—that is, that the actor
intend the actual consequences of his conduct, as distinguished
from the act that causes these consequences.”139 Hence, Villegas
affirmed and applied the first half of the Matter of J-E- standard,
namely, in absence of record evidence that individuals would
specifically intend to inflict harm on patients, CAT claimants must
show that public officials “created the[] conditions [in mental
health facilities] for the specific purpose of inflicting suffering upon
the patients.”140 Indeed, to avoid a misreading of Matter of J-E-,
Villegas signaled that IJs should focus on individuals’ intent, rather
than the intent of the government writ large, when it indicated that
the specific intent and government acquiescence analyses are
138. Case No. 3, at 18 (I.J. Dec. July 18, 2016) (citations omitted).
139. Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
140. Id.
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separate: “Zheng specifically addressed official acquiescence in
torture by private parties, intent of someone—either the
government official or the private party to whom the official
acquiesces—to inflict severe harm.”141 Despite this clear language,
many IJs erroneously interpret Matter of J-E- or Villegas to mean
that evidence of government negligence or resource scarcity
defeats specific intent.
The BIA’s Matter of J-R-G-P- decision appears to have
compounded this error.142 In Case No. 29, for example, the IJ
reduced evidence of the “abuse and mistreatment that occurs in
state-run mental health institutions in Mexico”143 to mere
“conditions” attributable to scarce resources, without inquiring
into whether the acts “abuse and mistreatment” perpetrated by
mental health workers themselves were specifically intended or
whether they are so common as to make it likely that the
respondent would experience them. To wit:
In Matter of J-R-G-P-, the Board took issue with the argument
that “abusive or squalid conditions in pretrial detention
facilities, prisons, or mental health institutions,” in Mexico was
sufficient evidence to establish that the government intended
to create these conditions and cause the facilities’ residents
severe pain or suffering. Where harmful conditions in
facilities, such as insufficient resources and training or neglect
on behalf of persons running the facilities, were beyond the
government’s control, the Board does not attribute them to the
action or inaction of the Mexican government.144

However, this IJ’s characterization of intentional, harmful
conduct by mental health workers as “conditions” misdirected her
inquiry. Citing Matter of J-R-G-P- appears to legitimize this
misdirection, but the BIA in Matter of J-R-G-P- was likely “battling
a strawman.”145 In J-R-G-P-, the BIA found, “The evidence of record
141. Id. See also R-A-F-, AXXX XXX 809 (B.I.A. Aug. 3, 2020) (unpublished) (“It is
important to emphasize that the “specific intent” element of the definition of ‘‘torture” is
separate and distinct from the requirement that torture be committed with the consent or
acquiescence of an official or an individual acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. §
1208.18(a) (outlining the elements of the definition of torture).”).
142. See generally Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 482 (B.I.A. 2018).
143. Id.
144. Case No. 29, at 8 (I.J. Dec. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
145. Roye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 693 F.3d 333, 342 (3d Cir. 2012).
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indicates that the substandard conditions in mental health
facilities, pretrial detention, and prisons in Mexico are the result of
neglect, lack of resources, or insufficient training and
education.”146 But the respondent in Matter of J-R-G-P-, in contrast
with Villegas, had not based his CAT claim solely on the conditions
inside mental health facilities. Instead, the respondent’s theory for
CAT relief turned on specific mental health workers “practices,
such as prolonged physical restraints, lobotomies, or
electroconvulsive therapy.”147 Conceivably, the IJ in Case No. 29
might reasonably have cited Matter of J-R-G-P- in support of a
conclusion that “although the record establishes that some
individuals committed to mental health facilities have experienced
abuse, the respondent has not shown that such abuse is so common
that it is more likely than not that he will personally experience
it.”148 But the IJ did not directly analyze the likelihood of the
respondent’s feared harms due to her application of Matter of J-RG-P- for the proposition that evidence of specific acts of “abuse and
mistreatment” by mental health workers was part and parcel of the
generalized conditions in mental health facilities caused by scarce
resources.149
C. Acquiescence as Intent
For CAT claims, the analysis of whether harms are
intentionally inflicted is distinct from who inflicts them. Moreover,
mental health workers who are government employees working in
state-operated inpatient mental health facilities should
presumably qualify as “public officials” for the purposes of the
FARRA regulations. Indeed, some, though not all,150 IJs have so
146. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 487.
147. Case No. 9, at 8 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017).
148. Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 486.
149. See, e.g., Case No. 46, at 4-5 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 24, 2021) (“In short, where a record
plausibly establishes that abusive or squalid conditions in pretrial detention facilities,
prisons, or mental health institutions . . . are the result of neglect, a lack of resources, or
insufficient training and education, rather than a specific intent to cause severe pain and
suffering, it is not error to find a respondent has not met his burden.” (quotations
omitted)).
150. See, e.g., Case No. 29, at 8 (I.J. Dec. 2019) (concluding “Respondent failed to
demonstrate that any harm he may experience in Mexico would occur with the
acquiescence of a public official or one acting in an official capacity” while solely focusing
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found.151 Among the decisions we reviewed, more often than not
IJs performed government acquiescence analyses without
specifically finding that mental health workers in state-operated
facilities were not government actors for the purposes of CAT
claims. Some IJs did so even after finding mental health workers
were government actors. For example, in Case No. 9, the IJ
conceded that “Mexican health workers act in an official capacity
for the purposes of determining eligibility for deferral of removal
under the CAT” but nevertheless performed a government
acquiescence analysis anyway.152
Some IJs appear to believe that CAT claimants must show
government acquiescence regardless of whether they allege
torture at the hands of government actors. Thus, in addition to
showing individual mental health workers’ specific intent to inflict
severe harm, these IJs obligate claimants to show that the Mexican
government writ large condones their conduct. For example, in
Case No. 29 the IJ found:
The Record does not demonstrate that the Mexican
government is willfully blind to the torture Respondent fears
in Mexico. . . . The Court notes that there certainly may be
abuse and mistreatment that occurs in state-run mental health
institutions in Mexico, however, the Record does not support
that the Mexican government is aware of this issue and
chooses to ignore it.153

Following this logic, some IJs consider public commitments by
governmental entities to improving conditions in facilities
sufficient to thwart CAT claims.154 Thus, CAT claimants effectively

on whether the Mexican government writ large is “willfully blind to the torture” even
though the respondent feared harm by mental health workers employed in state-run
facilities).
151. For example, in Case No. 7, at 4 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21, 2017) the IJ found that “health
workers at Mexican government operated and funded psychiatric facilities are public
officials or persons acting in an official capacity for the purpose of determining eligibility
for deferral of removal under the CAT.” Similarly, the IJ in Case No. 3, at 18 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2016) recognized that “it is true that government-funded hospitals and psychiatrists may
be considered part of the Mexican government.”
152. Case No. 9, at 7 n.5 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017).
153. Case No. 29, at 8 (I.J. Dec. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
154. Case No. 40, at 21 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13, 2021) (“The government’s stated
commitment to improving conditions weighs against a finding of specific intent.”).
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must overcome governments’ professed good intentions.155 In
Case No. 27, the IJ reached the same conclusion despite expressly
recognizing “that even a single public official can torture or
acquiesce in torture.”156 The judge concluded that a beneficent
desire by the Mexican government prevented the court from
finding that the abuses acknowledged within mental health
facilities constituted torture. Although governmental policies may
have some bearing on the intentions of public officials, they would
seem to be a poor proxy for what happens in practice, as
governments rarely formalize or advertise their intentions to harm
certain populations.157
Further, many IJs appear inclined to consider evidence of
government “good works” as foreclosing a specific intent finding.
In Case No. 8, the IJ concluded the respondent failed to prove “that
any long-term physical restraint, lobotomy, or other degrading
treatment that she may experience while institutionalized would
be performed by or at the acquiescence of the Mexican
government,” because
in the past fifteen years, the government of Mexico has begun
recognizing the rights of individuals with mental health issues,
protecting those rights, and instituting widespread mental
health reform . . . . While the mental healthcare system is by no
means perfect and appears to require further budgeting and
efforts, Mexico has taken steps in an attempt to assist those
with mental health conditions. As such, any mistreatment in a
psychiatric hospital would not rise to the level of torture and
would not be performed by or at the acquiescence of the
Mexican government.158

Thus, evidence that the Mexican government had taken steps
to close abusive institutions led this IJ to conclude that “any

155. More drastically, some IJs appear to expect of express pro-torture policies. See,
e.g., Case No. 3, at 19 (I.J. Dec. July 18, 2016) & Case No. 8, at 16 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 15, 2017)
(faulting respondents for failing to point to “laws directed at legalizing institutionalized
torture”).
156. Case No. 27, at 17 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2019) (“‘an applicant for CAT relief need not
show that the entire foreign government would consent to or acquiesce in his torture. He
need show only that “a public official” would so acquiesce.”) (internal citations omitted).
157. See Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 308 (Schmidt, dissenting) (observing that
governments are incentivized to conceal evidence of torture).
158. Case No. 8, at 16 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 15, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
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mistreatment in a psychiatric hospital” would not qualify as
torture.
Though some IJs concede that the actual “progress” made by
governments is inadequate, they nonetheless find lack of
acquiescence. In Case No. 27 the IJ was “deeply concerned with the
conditions in Mexican psychiatric facilities” and found “that
problems undoubtedly remain in Mexico’s mental health system,
the record also demonstrates that the government has taken steps
to address and improve conditions for individuals with mental
illness.” The same IJ credited the Mexican government’s “pledge[]
to make progress and protect the rights of persons with mental
illness.” Despite its “little advancement in improving its mental
health system and poor conditions continue to exist within
Mexican psychiatric facilities, . . . the Court finds that the Mexican
government has taken steps to address many of those issues, and
they are advancements nonetheless.”159
Similarly, the IJ in Case No. 23 found:
extensive evidence in the record describing efforts by the
Mexican government to improve the mental health care
system and provide outpatient and community based mental
health services to individuals with mental illness. Although
these efforts have not yet been fully unimplemented or
entirely effective, they nevertheless demonstrate that the
Mexican government does not consent or acquiesce to torture
within psychiatric hospitals.160

The IJ then proceeded to cite Chavarin v. Sessions for the
proposition that “evidence indicating that some progress has been
made ‘defeats the notion that the Mexican government intends to
cause severe pain and suffering.’”161 Thus, “some progress” by
governments was held by some IJs as a bar to finding that the
government writ large specifically intends to inflict harm in mental
health facilities.
159. Case No. 27, at 16 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2019).
160. Case No. 23, at 27 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019).
161. Id. Elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit has chastised DHS for relying on Chavarin in part
because it is “a non-precedential memorandum.” Guerra v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128, 1135, n.5
(9th Cir. 2020), amended by Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Chavarin
v. Sessions, 690 F. App’x 924, 926 (9th Cir. 2017)). Note also that the BIA relied in part on
Chavarin in Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 485 (internal citations omitted).
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Indeed, these IJs may conflate the distinct specific intent and
government acquiescence elements of a CAT claim, as shown by
Roye v. Attorney General of U.S. There, the IJ had found that “the
widespread physical and sexual abuse of mentally ill inmates in
Jamaican prisons” by guards and other inmates “was specifically
intended to cause severe pain and suffering.”162 Although the BIA
did not dispute this finding, it reversed, stating that the respondent
had failed to show he would “be imprisoned by Jamaican
authorities for the specific purpose of torturing him.”163 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of the FARRA
regulations and characterized the BIA’s approach as “battling a
strawman.”164 It held that the BIA “confused two distinct elements
of a claim for relief under the CAT—i.e., torture versus consent to
or acquiescence in torture—and further confused the mental
states associated with each.”165 The Court explained that Roye’s
CAT claim was based not on “whether the act of detaining mentally
ill deportees is an act of torture” but on “whether the physical and
sexual abuse of mentally ill prisoners that occurs in Jamaican
prisons rises to the level of torture.”166 Thus, the BIA applied the
specific intent standard “to the wrong question, ignoring the IJ’s
finding on specific intent and bypassing consideration of whether
the physical and sexual assaults that Roye is likely to experience
during a term of incarceration in a Jamaican prison rise to the level
of torture under the CAT.”167 The BIA “failed to attend to Roye’s
actual argument regarding the intent of those who will likely
assault him.”168 Instead of examining separately the specific intent
and government acquiescence elements of a CAT claim, “the BIA
mixed them together, saying that evidence that the Jamaican
government is willfully blind to the mistreatment of mentally ill
prisoners could not prove specific intent to cause pain and
suffering.”169
162. Roye v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 693 F.3d 333, 341-42 (3d Cir. 2012). See also ANKER,
supra note 80, § 7:26.
163. Roye, 693 F.3d at 341-42.
164. Id. at 342.
165. Id. at 344.
166. Id. at 342.
167. Id. (internal citations omitted).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 344.
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Consequently, IJs that require evidence of government
acquiescence in addition to the specific intent of mental health
workers likely commit the same error that the Roye Court sought
to correct.170 Unlike the intent of governmental entities approach
described above, which may distract IJs from evidence of
intentional, harmful acts by workers in mental health facilities,
some IJs’ extraneous government acquiescence inquiries appear to
negate evidence of individual mental health workers’ intent
altogether.
D. Individuals’ Intent
By contrast with some IJs’ tendency to focus on the intentions
of governmental entities, either in specific intent or extraneous
government acquiescence analyses, others directly address the
intent of individual workers in mental health facilities. Here, too,
IJs’ application of precedent suggests troubling trends. First, some
IJs find that mental health workers’ lack of training, education, or
professionalization prevents them from forming the requisite level
of intent to inflict harm. But it is counterfactual to expect only those
with special expertise to know that prolonged mechanical or
chemical restraints cause severe pain or suffering. Second, some IJs
intone that mental health workers intend “to treat, not torture”
persons with psychosocial disabilities, even when the workers
apply electroconvulsive therapies without safeguards, use
prolonged mechanical restraints, or administer psychotropic
medications without therapeutic justification. Although IJs appear
inclined to count workers’ beneficent intentions against CAT
claimants, they generally do not consider evidence of more
coercive aims, namely, to control or to discipline patients, to
constitute proscribed purposes that might satisfy the specific
intent element of their CAT claims.

170. Moreover, as a practical matter, few governments have official policies of
torture against certain groups, and even fewer noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities
have the wherewithal to unearth them. As some immigration adjudicators themselves
recognize, the international condemnation of torture likely incentivizes governments “to
conceal or minimize the evidence of torture[.]” Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 308
(Schmidt, dissenting).
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1. Ignorance
Some IJs consider lack of training or education among mental
health workers to negate their specific intent to inflict harm. For
example, the IJ in Case No. 42 attributed mental health workers’
mistreatment of patients to a “deficiency of properly trained
personnel.”171 The IJ observed, “[t]hough Mexican mental health
professionals overmedicated patients and used physical restraints,
at best only 5-11% of them have received more than two days
worthy [sic] of training in mental health.”172 Likewise, the IJ in Case
No. 24 concluded that mental health workers reported beliefs’ that
“the use of restraints or overmedication to be ‘the only thing to do’
when patients become self-injurious or aggressive,” foreclosed a
specific intent finding.173 Despite acknowledging evidence of
“abusive practices in such facilities that may rise to the level of
torture,”174 and notwithstanding expert testimony that mental
health workers apply prolonged restraints for “sheer
convenience,” not out of ignorance, and the IJ attributed these
beliefs to “a lack of education,” noting that “scarce economic
resources prohibit the development of education and training.”175
IJs have overwhelmingly cited Matter of J-R-G-P- for the
proposition that “abusive or squalid conditions in pretrial facilities,
prisons, or mental health institutions in the country of removal are
the result of neglect, a lack of resources, or insufficient training and
education, rather than a specific intent to cause severe pain and
suffering.”176 In the underlying IJ decision, the IJ conceded that the
171. Case No. 42, at 24 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 11, 2021).
172. Id. at 24-25.
173. Case No. 24, at 23 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019). Case No. 21 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20, 2018)
uses identical language at 26.
174. Case No. 24, at 22 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019).
175. Case No. 24, at 23 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019). Case No. 21 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20, 2018)
uses identical language at 26, although the expert’s testimony varied.
176. See Case No. 41, at 14-15 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 26, 2021); Case No. 28, at 26 (I.J. Dec. Dec.
26, 2019); Case No. 22, at 21 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 31, 2019); Case No. 48, at 11 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4,
2021); Case No. 30, at 18 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020); Case No. 36, at 22 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 27, 2020);
Case No. 24, at 23 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019); Case No. 25, at 18 (I.J. Dec. June 27, 2019); Case
No. 38, at 17 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 22, 2020); Case No. 21, at 26 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20, 2018); Case No.
44, at 9 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 2021); Case No. 29, at 8 (I.J. Dec. 2019); Case No. 39, at 15 (I.J. Dec.
Nov. 25, 2020); Case No. 40, at 21-22, (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13, 2021); Case No. 46, at 4 (I.J. Dec.
Aug. 24, 2021); Case No. 43, at 13 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 29, 2021); Case No. 31, at 13 (I.J. Dec. Jan.
22, 2020); Case No. 23, at 27 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019); see also Case No. 42, at 24 (I.J. Dec.
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respondent would likely be “involuntarily hospitalized in a
psychiatric institution if removed to Mexico” based on the
respondent’s history of at least four past involuntary
hospitalizations, lack of insight into his mental health condition,
and consistent refusal to take medications.177 The IJ recognized the
country conditions expert’s testimony that “patients—particularly
patients who display ‘erratic’ behavior as part of their conditions—
are often subjected to a range of abusive practices, such as
isolation, prolonged physical restraints, lobotomies, and
electroconvulsive therapy, to control and constrain their actions”
and “that several of these treatments could rise to the level of
torture.”178
Nevertheless, the IJ concluded that the “rampant human
rights abuses committed by workers in mental health institutions
and care facilities across Mexico” were not specifically intended;
rather, they merely resulted from “historical gross negligence and
misunderstanding of the nature of psychiatric illness.”179 Instead
of “specific intent to torture patients under their care,” mental
health workers intend “to control violent behavior” and “lack []
more humane options.”180 The IJ continued:
Further, the workers stated they lacked the resources for
alternative forms of treatment and so, relied on more
primitive methods for administrative convenience. . . . The
workers considered physical restraints to be the “only option”
out of a misguided sense that the restraints were medically
necessary for the patients’ wellbeing.”181

For the IJ, the facts “closely mirror[ed] those in Villegas,” even
though the record in Villegas does not appear to include testimony
by an expert who had witnessed firsthand the application of
prolonged physical restraints in Mexican mental health
facilities.182 Thus, the IJ concluded that mental health workers’
“intent to control” patients using “primitive methods” for
Mar. 11, 2021) (remaining “unconvinced that, more likely than not, the mistreatment
would be motivated by a specific desire to cause severe pain and suffering as opposed to a
lack of mental health resources”).
177. Case No. 9, at 5 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017).
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. at 8 (quoting Villegas, 523 F.3d at 989).
180. Id.
181. Case No. 9, at 8 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
182. Id. at 9.
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“administrative convenience” due to “misguided belief[s]”
prevented a specific intent finding.
This much is clear: with Matter of J-R-G-P-, the BIA amplified
Villegas, along with many IJs’ tendency to overextend its core
holding that merely affirmed the specific intent requirement for
CAT claims, to removal proceedings involving noncitizens with
psychosocial disabilities far beyond purview of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. As Table 4 shows, it has been referenced in all but
six of the thirty-two IJ decisions that have followed J-R-G-P-. As
measured by number of citations, it appears to have had the
greatest influence among IJs denying CAT claims, even though the
Ninth Circuit recently remanded it to the BIA for further review of
the respondent’s fear of experiencing sexual abuse in mental
health facilities.183
The BIA correctly stated the Villegas Court’s conclusion that
“subjecting patients to the poor conditions in Mexico’s mental
health facilities” did not satisfy the elements of a CAT claim.184 But
like many IJs, the BIA overlooked that in contrast with Villegas, the
case before it contained record evidence both in reports of
investigations and in expert testimony that mental health workers
intentionally caused institutionalized patients harm. The BIA
instead observed that “the record reflects that the conditions in
that country’s mental institutions are the result of limited options
for controlling patients’ violent behavior and a lack of resources
and training—not a specific intent to inflict pain or suffering on
patients.”185 In doing so, the BIA made no mention of the facts
regarding use of prolonged physical restraints that the IJ found
insufficient to show specific intent. Instead, it only engaged the
expert’s testimony on the issue of acquiescence, which as we
explain in greater detail in Section IV.C, should not have been in
dispute where the mental health workers in question were public
employees and therefore government agents.186 The BIA’s decision
is devoid of discussion of the IJ’s dispositive analysis of mental

183. Penaloza v. Garland, No. 18-72993, 2022 WL 522418, at *2 (9th Cir. 2022)
(concluding the “BIA erred in failing to address Gutierrez’s arguments that he would more
likely than not be subject to sexual abuse in a Mexican mental health facility”).
184. Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 485.
185. Id. at 486-87.
186. Id. at 487.
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health workers’ intent. We are unaware of other intentional,
severely harmful acts that are simply excusable by lack of training.
2. Purpose
When assessing the intent of individual mental health
workers, some IJs consider evidence of workers’ good intentions to
defeat a specific intent finding. For example, the IJ in Case No. 17
noted that “well-meaning staff” reported keeping “patients in cages
for safety reasons” and benignly medicating patients “to keep them
calm.”187 Although the IJ conceded that these methods reflected
“antiquated notions about mental health treatment,” their good
intentions nevertheless foreclosed a specific intent finding.188 This
line of reasoning is hardly unique.189 Indeed, some IJs’ reasoning
appears to be formulaic and only loosely tied to the records before
them, as very similar language appears in cases involving markedly
different country contexts. The below excerpt is reproduced nearly
verbatim in different cases involving Brazil, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Mexico:
There is no evidence the staff of these institutions intend to
torture patients rather than treat their illnesses. The record
does not reflect that health workers acting in an official
capacity or serving as government employees would have
specifically intended to severely harm patients, even if it was
the foreseeable consequence.190

187. Id.
188. Case No. 17, at 6 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 28, 2018) (citations omitted).
189. See Case No. 3, at 18 (I.J. Dec. July 18, 2016) (giving weight to “the reason
proffered by the hospitals for restraining patients is safety”).
190. See Case No. 11, at 35 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 25, 2018); Case No. 13, at 21 (I.J. Dec. May
14, 2018); Case No. 16, at 22 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 10, 2018); Case No. 18, at 24 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4,
2018); Case No. 19, at 19 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2018); see also Case No. 30, at 18 (I.J. Dec. Jan.
22, 2020) (finding “insufficient evidence to conclude that these workers intend to torture
patients, rather than to treat their illnesses, maintain order within psychiatric facilities,
and prevent aggressive and potentially dangerous behavior”); Case No. 23, at 27 (I.J. Dec.
Mar. 22, 2019) (finding “insufficient evidence to conclude that these workers intend to
torture patients, even if that is the result, rather than to treat their illnesses”); Case No. 9,
at 10 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017) & Case No. 6, at 6 (Apr. 21, 2017) (“[W]ithout evidence clearly
establishing that public officials at these facilities deliberately implemented procedures
designed to punish rather than to treat, the Court is unable to conclude they specifically
intended to torture their patients.”).
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However, the simplistic syllogism that “intent to treat”
forecloses a specific intent finding fails for several reasons. Such a
construction of the FARRA regulations is tantamount to requiring
CAT claimants to show that mental health workers exclusively
intend to cause severe harm, an interpretation that was advanced
in the notorious “torture memos” of the second Bush
Administration and later repudiated.191 Neither the FARRA
regulations nor the CAT require that torturers have an exclusive
intent to cause severe harm, in contrast with other statutes that
have been interpreted to have more exacting intent requirements.
In fact, the CAT Committee has observed that evidence of
proscribed purpose can support a finding of intentionality,192 in
stark contrast with the IJs who use mental health workers’ motives
to undermine evidence of intent.193 While not all mental health
workers may primarily intend to cause severe harm through their
use of coercive mental health methods, courts have not construed
“specifically” to mean “exclusively” for CAT claims.
Moreover, even at criminal law intent is distinct from
motive.194 In other words, why mental health workers might cause
severe harm is distinct from whether they will do so with the
191. Compare Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C. S 2340-2340A, at 3-4 (Aug. 1, 2002) (arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 2340, which tracks the
FARRA regulations torture definition, “requires that a defendant act with the specific
intent to inflict severe pain, the infliction of such pain must be the defendant's precise
objective”) [hereinafter Bybee Memo] with Levin Memo, supra note 83, at 16 n.27
(rejecting the “precise objective” interpretation). See also Hathaway et al., supra note 77,
at 793 (noting that under the Bybee Memo’s standard, “if the accused knowingly causes
pain or suffering but had some other objective for which pain and suffering was merely
incidental, such as extracting information, he lacks the requisite ‘specific intent’").
192. See discussion supra Section III.C.
193. See discussion supra Section III.C.
194. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1991). Accord Levin Memo,
supra note 83, at 17 (maintaining that “specific intent must be distinguished from motive.
There is no exception under the statute permitting torture to be used for a ‘good reason.’
Thus, a defendant's motive (to protect national security, for example) is not relevant to the
question whether he has acted with the requisite specific intent under the statute.”). See
also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovak, & Yukovic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 155 (June 12, 2002) (rejecting appellant’s argument that
his aim of sexual gratification in raping Muslim women defeating a finding that he acted
for a proscribed purpose and holding that so long as “one prohibited purpose is fulfilled
by the conduct, the fact that such conduct was also intended to achieve a non-listed
purpose (even one of a sexual nature) is immaterial”).
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requisite intent—purposely, knowingly, or otherwise.195 Indeed,
the CAT and FARRA regulations both establish intent and purpose
as discrete elements. In fact, although evidence of proscribed
purpose may support an inference of specific intent,196 it is unclear
whether the converse holds true. Should evidence mental health
workers’ motives be permitted to negate their mental state, then
two distinct elements of a CAT claim would be diametrically
opposed—a construction of the FARRA regulations yielding
absurd results.
Last, such a construction ignores the harms known to stem
from mental health coercion. The scientific literature on the
efficacy of coercive mental health treatment undermines mental
health workers’ claims that their intent is not to harm.197 In
contrast to Haiti’s blanket policy of detaining all criminal
deportees, most countries do not have a blanket policy of
institutionalizing all persons with psychosocial disabilities.198 Far
from an “unintended consequence,” the effects of prolonged
mechanical or chemical restraints or electroconvulsive therapies
without safeguards are both intuitive and well-known among the
global mental health community.199 It seems perverse to expect
that would-be torturers first be sufficiently trained on mental
health care standards before they form the requisite intent in
applying coercing methods.
Indeed, other than to undercut evidence of mental health
workers’ mental state, IJs give little attention to evidence
195. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2).
196. See discussion supra Section III.D.
197. See discussion supra Part II.
198. See generally Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002).
199. See, e.g., Pierre v. Gonzales 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007); see also discussion supra
Section II.B; SRT Report 2020, supra note 53, at ¶ 37 (stressing that “purportedly
benevolent purposes cannot, per se, vindicate coercive or discriminatory measures”); SRT
Interim Report 2008 supra note 22, at 49 (noting “serious violations and discrimination
against persons with disabilities may be masked as ‘good intentions’ on the part of health
professionals”). Indeed, the IJ decision granting CAT relief that led to Matter of R-A-F- has
seen through the claims by mental health workers on which other IJs have relied that
[i]n many cases, the type of “treatment” provided to patients is carried out under the
claim that it is intended to benefit the patient. However, medical treatments of an
intrusive and irreversible nature, when lacking a therapeutic purpose, may constitute
torture or ill-treatment when enforced or administered without the free and
informed consent of the person concerned.
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suggesting that mental health workers’ coercive aims may in fact
constitute proscribed purposes. Particularly, no IJs directly
addressed whether mental health workers’ aim to “control”
patients constitute the proscribed purpose of “coercion.” Further,
instead of expressly determining whether controlling patients’
behavior qualifies as a proscribed purpose, some IJs find mental
health workers’ reasons for using coercive methods on persons
with psychosocial disabilities to be legitimate. Thus, paradoxically,
evidence of proscribed purposes for inflicting severe harm in effect
undercuts evidence of specific intent.
For example, in Case No. 7 respondent’s expert presented
uncontroverted testimony that “health workers deliberately
employed these practices because they sought to punish and
discipline patients.”200 Yet, apparently ignoring this specific and
uncontroverted evidence, the IJ concluded: “Without evidence
clearly establishing that workers at these facilities deliberately
implemented procedures designed to punish rather than to treat,
the court is unable to conclude that they specifically intended to
torture patients.”201
Indeed, some IJs demonstrated beliefs that harmful coercive
practices are part and parcel of standard mental health care. For
example, the IJ in Case No. 48 found:
the record shows staff members use physical restraints when
they are deemed “necessary” to control the behavioral
symptoms of institutionalized patients, needed to control
“aggressive” or “difficult” patients, required to prevent
“disruptive behavior,” or implemented for staff “convenience”
or in lieu of “alternative care.” Similarly, staff members
rationalize that overmedication and sedation is necessary to
control “unruly” or “difficult” patient behavior, or to keep
patients “calm.”202
200. Case No. 7, at 5 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21, 2017).
201. Id. at 6. See also Case No. 20, at 15 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 19, 2018) (“Rather, the evidence
suggests the goal of health care workers in Mexican psychiatric hospitals is to maintain
order and control within the facilities, not to torture or harm the patients.”) (emphasis
added).
202. Case No. 48, at 9 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4, 2021) (emphasis added). See also Case No. 24,
at 22 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019) (observing that mental health workers use “prolonged
physical restraints and overmedication . . . as a means to control patients’ self-abusive or
aggressive behavior”) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in Case No. 23 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019) the IJ
regarded mental health workers’ desire to “maintain order” when
applying mind-altering substances in psychiatric facilities to
foreclose a finding of harmful intent.203 The IJ, moreover,
characterized evidence of unchecked use of chemical and physical
restraints in Mexican psychiatric facilities as insufficient “to
demonstrate that mental health workers intend to torture patients
with schizophrenia” and merely indicative “that these forms of
treatment are used to prevent aggressive and potentially
dangerous behavior.”204 Instead, mental health workers’
controlling purpose indicated a lack of specific intent to inflict
harm. Thus, the IJ appeared to use evidence satisfying one prong of
the respondent’s CAT claim to negate evidence of another prong.
Strikingly, some IJs all but expressly name an enumerated
proscribed purpose in the course of finding that mental health
workers lack specific intent. For example, the IJ in Case No. 31
concluded that mental health workers lack specific intent to inflict
severe harm despite expert testimony that “prolonged physical
and chemical restraints, the administration of psychotropic
medications, and the application of electroconvulsive therapy, all
without documented clinical necessity . . . are utilized as a means
to control and discipline patients.”205 Nevertheless, these IJs
ultimately found that workers’ aim of controlling or punishing
patients—rather than satisfying the proscribed purpose element
of the respondents’ CAT claims206—instead disqualified this
conduct as torture.
V. DISCUSSION
The decisions we reviewed demonstrate concerning trends in
how IJs apply the FARRA regulations to CAT claims by noncitizens
203. Case No. 23, at 27 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019). See also Case No. 20, at 15 (I.J. Dec.
Nov. 19, 2018) (reasoning that “the goal of health care workers in Mexican psychiatric
hospitals is to maintain order and control within the facilities, not to torture or harm the
patients”).
204. Case No. 23, at 27 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019).
205. Case No. 31, at 12 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020). “Punishment” is also a proscribed
purpose. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). See also CAT, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
206. See SRT Interim Report 2008, supra note 22, ¶ 63, (characterizing mental health
workers’ use of “psychiatric medication, including neuroleptics and other mind-altering
drugs [on] persons with mental disabilities . . . under coercion, or as a form of punishment
. . . as a form of torture”).
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with psychosocial disabilities fearing harm by mental health
workers. Some IJs’ focus on discerning the intentions of
governments writ large leads them to overlook whether individual
mental health workers’ intent satisfies that element of a CAT claim.
This approach to intent appears heavily influenced by earlier cases,
especially Matter of J-E- and Villegas, that were based on fact
patterns that lacked clear evidence of individual actors’ mental
state, and therefore are less instructive for fact patterns that
include evidence of harm by individual actors, not entities. In
Matter of J-E-, the operative act underlying the respondent’s CAT
claim was Haitian authorities’ detention of criminal deportees in
substandard conditions;207 analogously, in Villegas, the operative
act was the Mexican government’s warehousing of mental health
patients in “terrible squalor.”208 In Matter of J-E-, the BIA appeared
to recognize that certain acts perpetrated by prison guards might
have been shown to constitute torture, had these acts been
“pervasive and widespread” rather than “isolated.”209 Relatedly,
not only did the Villegas Court not address whether specific
coercive mental health practices constitute torture, the court
appears to have indicated that IJs should focus on individuals’
intent, rather than the intent of the government writ large.210
Other IJs adopting this intent of governmental entities
approach appear to suggest that legal precedents prevent them
from finding that mental health workers specifically intend to
inflict severe harm where challenging environmental factors, such
as historical negligence by government entities or resource
scarcity, also appear to contribute to the prevalence of coercive
mental health practices. In addition to Matter of J-E- and Villegas,
these IJs tend to rely on overly broad applications of Matter of J-R207. Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002).
208. Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2008).
209. Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 303. See also id. at 302 (“Instances of police
brutality do not necessarily rise to the level of torture, whereas deliberate vicious acts such
as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, kalot marassa, and electric shock may
constitute acts of torture.”).
210. Villegas, 523 F.3d at 989. See also J-G-C-R-, AXXX XXX 347, at 3 (B.I.A. No. 30,
2016) (unpublished) (remanding an IJ’s denial of relief because “[i]mplicit in the
Immigration Judge's decision is the view that the relevant government actor is the
government writ large, or higher level decision-makers, and not the health care workers”
with instructions to examine individual workers’ mental state).
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G-P- and Matter of R-A-F-.211 They use these precedents to
characterize coercive mental health practices as “conditions”
endemic to institutional mental health settings rather than willful,
individual acts by workers in those settings. Indeed, some IJs
appear to engage in a form of external displacement,212 whereby
environmental factors overshadow individual mental health
workers’ role in carrying out coercive acts. Even if systemic issues
such as historical neglect or scarce resources may in fact
contribute to lack of accountability for harmful mental health
coercion, it is unclear why such conditions should in effect
immunize individual actors from scrutiny for their conduct in the
context of IJs’ specific intent analyses.
Moreover, some IJs’ approach to the government involvement
element of CAT claims appears to raise the bar for claimants
fearing harm at the hands of mental health workers employed by
those very governments in their state-operated facilities. Some IJs
appear to require CAT claimants to show government
acquiescence without specifying why these workers are not
government actors for the purpose of CAT claims.213 Other IJs
appear to confuse the distinct specific intent and government
involvement elements of CAT claims, cataloging governmental
good works in the mental health arena as evidence undercutting
mental health workers’ specific intent.214 Equally troublingly, some
IJs appear to consider that either professions of good intentions or
well-intentioned but ineffective efforts by governments to improve
mental health systems are sufficient to defeat CAT claims.215 These
tendencies in effect demand showings by CAT claimants in excess
of the FARRA regulations’ requirements.

211. See discussion supra Section IV.B.2; see also infra Table 3.
212. See generally Nils Melzer (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Interim Report, U.N. Doc. A/75/179
(July 20, 2020) (describing various psychological defense mechanisms triggered by
evidence of torturous conduct).
213. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
214. See id. See also R-A-F-, AXXX XXX 809, 3 (B.I.A. Aug. 3, 2020) (unpublished)
(emphasizing “that the ‘specific intent’ element of the definition of ‘torture’ is separate and
distinct from the requirement that torture be committed with the consent or acquiescence
of an official or an individual acting in an official capacity”).
215. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
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Finally, some IJs adopting an individual intent approach
conclude that mental health workers lack specific intent due to
either ignorance or good intentions.216 Citing Matter of J-R-G-P-,
some IJs find that “insufficient training or education” for mental
health workers prevents them from forming a torturous mental
state.217 These IJs appear to assume that mental health workers
require a certain degree of training to understand that mental
health coercion causes severe harm. Notably, it is unclear that
there is an analogous “sufficient training” requirement in nonmental health contexts to show specific intent. Other IJs cite
workers’ intent “to treat, not torture” as preventing a specific
intent finding.218 These IJs’ reasoning implies that respondents are
required to show that prospective torturers exclusively intend to
cause them severe harm. This interpretation of the FARRA
regulations featured prominently in the repudiated “torture
memos.”219 Moreover, it ignores the practice of US courts as well as
international adjudicators to consider evidence of proscribed
purpose sufficient to satisfy the United States’ specific intent
requirement.220 Instead, some IJs improperly use evidence that
mental health workers seek to coerce patients to foreclose specific
intent findings.
At the same time, as previously noted, most IJs appear to
concede that harms caused by psychosurgeries, use of
electroshock without safeguards, administration of chemical
restraints, prolonged application of mechanical restraints, and
other coercive mental health practices may constitute torture.221
Many also find “troubling and unfortunate” circumstances of

216. See discussion supra Section IV.D.
217. See discussion supra Section IV.D.1.
218. See discussion supra Section IV.D.2.
219. See Bybee Memo, supra note 191; see also generally Dep’t of Justice, Office of
Professional Responsibility, Report: Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced
Interrogation
Techniques”
on
Suspected
Terrorists
(July
29,
2009),
https://irp.fas.org/agency/doj/opr-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BXB-NVN7] (describing
the Bybee Memo’s genesis and related opinions).
220. See Hathaway et al., supra note 77, at 820.
221. See discussion supra at n.105.
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mental health service users face in their countries of origin,222 and
are “deeply” or “extremely concerned” by evidence of
mistreatment by mental health workers.223 Nevertheless, they
reason that governments’ ineffective efforts, minimal progress,
and stated commitments to improve mental health systems defeat
specific intent.224 Fundamentally, whether IJs ascribe the
prevalence of coercive mental health care to resource limitations
or professionals’ outmoded beliefs or ignorance, IJs appear
disinclined to conclude that coercive mental health care practices
constitute torture where they believe that the circumstances in
respondents’ countries of origin in effect render coercion
inevitable in providing care to persons with psychosocial
disabilities.225
In essence, many IJs appear resistant to conclude that mental
health workers ever specifically intend to cause severe harm on
persons with psychosocial disabilities in institutional settings. IJs
222. See, e.g., Case No. 15, at 10 (I.J. Dec. July 18, 2018); Case No. 27, at 12-13 & 1516 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2019); Case No. 30, at 17 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020); Case No. 42, at 25 (I.J.
Dec. Mar. 11, 2021); Case No. 46, at 6 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 24, 2021).
223. See, e.g., Case No. 5, at 11 (Mar. 24, 2017); Case No. 7, at 6 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21, 2017);
Case No. 9, at 6 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017); Case No. 10, at 24 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 7, 2018); Case No.
27, at 16 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2019).
224. See, e.g., Case No. 20, at 15 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 19, 2018) (“Additionally, although
progress has been slight, the Mexican government has made some steps towards
improving conditions for individuals with mental illness and patients in psychiatric
hospitals. This suggests conditions in the Mexican mental health system are not
necessarily the result of a specific intent to harm individuals with mental illness.”) (citing
Villegas); Case No. 23, at 27 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019) (“Second, there is extensive evidence
in the record describing efforts by the Mexican government to improve the mental health
care system and provide outpatient and community-based mental health services to
individuals with mental illnesses. Although these efforts have not yet been fully
implemented or entirely effective, they nevertheless demonstrate that the Mexican
government does not consent or acquiesce to torture within psychiatric hospitals.”)
(internal citations omitted); Case No. 39, at 15 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 25, 2020) (“[W]hile progress
to improve the mental health care system in El Salvador has been slow, evidence of record
indicates that organizations like MSF, who work together with the Salvadoran
government's Ministry of Health, have made some strides to improve mental health care
access in the country.”); Case No. 40, at 21 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13, 2021) (“Just as in J-R-G-P-, the
government has shown a desire to improve conditions and move to a better model of care;
granted, the process appears to be moving slowly. The government's stated commitment
to improving conditions weighs against a finding of specific intent.”) (internal citations
omitted).
225. See, e.g., Case No. 7, at 5 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21, 2017); Case No. 9, at 8 (I.J. Dec. Nov.
27, 2017); Case No. 21, at 26 (Nov. 20, 2018); Case No. 44, at 13 (Apr. 2021); Case No. 45,
at 8 (I.J. Dec. June 2021); Case No. 47, at 14 (Sept. 1, 2021).
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frequently found that evidence of workers’ specific intent is
negated by their good intentions or those professed by the
government writ large.226 None of the IJs appears to have
considered that evidence of mental health workers’ aims to control
patients may constitute “coercion,” one of the enumerated
proscribed purposes in both the FARRA regulations and the
CAT.227 Instead, many IJs buttressed their reasoning with
questionable interpretations of Villegas, Matter of J-E-, and more
recently Matter of J-R-G-P- and Matter of R-A-F-.228
In this respect, noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities
advancing CAT claims predicated on harms in institutional mental
health settings appear to be confronting attitudes similar to those
that the global psychiatric survivor movement has long struggled
against.229 The CRPD has helped to elevate the voices of psychiatric
survivors and mental health users, and its reframing of coercive
mental health practices as implicating core human rights
protections against torture has garnered allies among the
professional mental health community. And even though the
United States has not ratified the CRPD, these developments may
over time play a greater role in IJs’ deliberations. Indeed, our
organization, the Harvard Law School Project on Disability
(HPOD), together with other disability rights actors, has
endeavored to bring these considerations to bear through several
recent amicus curiae briefs in several appeals originating from CAT
claims.230
Framing harmful mental health practices as forms of
“coercion” may help IJs to connect the dots between the fears of
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities and conduct prohibited
by CAT. US courts generally do not separately analyze proscribed
purpose as a distinct element of CAT claims; where discussed, this
element is often “subsumed” in specific intent analyses.231 This
226.
227.
228.
229.

See discussion supra Sections IV.B.2 & IV.D.1.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.18a(1); CAT, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
See discussion supra, at Section IV.B. See also infra Table 3.
See generally LINDA J. MORRISON, TALKING BACK TO PSYCHIATRY: THE PSYCHIATRIC
CONSUMER/SURVIVOR/EX-PATIENT MOVEMENT (2013).
230. For example, HPOD intervened as amicus in Penaloza v. Garland, 2022 WL
522418 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2022); Villegas-Gomez v. Garland, 2022 WL 71823 (9th Cir. Jan.
7, 2022); Coronel Resendiz v. Barr, 810 Fed.Appx. 538 (9th Cir. 2020); and ClementePacheco v. Sessions, 732 Fed.Appx. 537 (9th Cir. 2018).
231. See discussion supra Section III.D.
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pattern holds true among the IJ decisions we reviewed. Moreover,
US courts’ tendency to consider proscribed purpose as part of their
specific intent analyses suggests to us that at least some
adjudicators may be open to considering evidence of one or more
enumerated proscribed purposes as satisfying the specific intent
element of CAT claims.
To us, this suggests a possible opening for CAT claimants
fearing mental health harms to satisfy the specific intent element.
Although a consensus definition of “coercion” in mental health
contexts has yet to emerge, there is limited precedent delimiting
the parameters of “coercion” as defined by CAT, FARRA, and its
regulations.232 As evident from several IJs’ decisions we reviewed,
unsuccessful CAT claimants have nevertheless succeeded in
persuading IJs that mental health workers aim to control or to
punish patients in institutional settings.233 It is unclear from the
decisions themselves whether CAT claimants have expressly
argued that these aims amount to coercion. But the growing
scientific literature on mental health coercion seems to present a
potent resource for CAT claimants seeking to connect those dots.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Bridging the gap between mental health coercion and conduct
triggering CAT non-refoulement protection will not happen
overnight. Incremental, resource-intensive case-by-case efforts
will require thoughtful coordination to have noticeable effects,
though singular cases can have outsized impacts. We offer the
following recommendations for representatives of CAT claimants,
US immigration policymakers, and international monitors to help
ensure that the United States fulfills its non-refoulement
obligations as they apply to noncitizens with psychosocial
disabilities.

232. We note simply that BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) defines “coercion”
as “[c]ompulsion of a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical
force,” which on its face appears to align with the common usage referenced in Gooding et
al., supra note 31, at 9.
233. See discussion supra Section IV.D.2.
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A. Strategies for Practitioners
Practitioners should direct IJs’ attention to the intent of
individual mental health workers.234 Where IJs focus on the intent
of governments writ large, practitioners should directly challenge
such reasoning as premised on mistaken interpretations of Matter
of J-E- and Matter of J-R-P-G-, for example, by analogizing their
specific intent errors with the government acquiescence error
detected in Roye. Moreover, practitioners should be attentive to the
multiple kinds of interpretative errors we describe in Part IV, with
an eye to arguing on appeal that these are errors of law and
therefore warrant de novo review.235
IJs likely have limited awareness of the growing mental health
coercion literature. To a certain extent, their decisions are confined
by the evidence presented to them. Here, representatives of
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities have an important role
to play in educating IJs on contemporary views on coercive mental
health practices. Presenting additional information from the
scientific literature about the harm and intentionality inherent to
use of electroshock without safeguards, administration of chemical
restraints, and prolonged application of mechanical restraints may
help to supplant paternalistic notions about appropriate standards
of care for persons with psychosocial disabilities that IJs may
harbor. In addition, practitioners should consider marshaling
arguments that such forms of coercion constitute evidence of
proscribed purpose that might also satisfy specific intent.
Further, practitioners should impress upon IJs that unlike
prisons, there is no overriding imperative to involuntarily detain
persons with psychosocial disabilities in institutional mental
health settings. Even if in certain contexts mental health workers
truly have no alternative, non-coercive forms of treatment, they
also have the option of refraining from harmful methods and
234. Arguments that “the conditions inside the public mental health institutions
alone” appear destined to fail. See, e.g., Case No. 13, at 21 (I.J. Dec. May 14, 2018); Case No.
16, at 21 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 10, 2018); Case No. 18, at 23 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4, 2018); Case No. 19, at
18 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2018).
235. Matter of R-A-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 778, 779–80 (A.G. 2020) (directing the BIA to
review de novo IJs’ application of legal standards to elements of CAT claims). But see Guerra
v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2020), amended by Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 913
(9th Cir. 2020) (describing the specific intent determination as question of fact subject to
clear error review) (citing Ridore, 696 F.3d at 916-17).

834

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:5

working to release patients. While it may be true that some
persons with psychosocial disabilities could ultimately benefit
from some involuntary treatments, the peremptory jus cogens
nature of the universal prohibition on torture should override
mental health service providers’ beneficence.
Finally, practitioners should also specifically invite experts to
characterize findings presented in other country conditions
exhibits, so that they can provide expert opinions as to the motives
of mental health workers, while avoiding unnecessary discussion
of governmental policies or other environmental factors, which
appear to distract some IJs from workers’ mental state.
Practitioners might also consider carefully how to frame
documentary evidence that IJs have already frequently used to
justify CAT denials. While some courts may be willing to affirm
grants of CAT relief based on IJs’ findings that mental health and
other facilities are used to inflict severe harm,236 reports that
describe at length the conditions inside mental health facilities
may ultimately distract IJs from the few specific acts that might
more readily qualify as torture. While there is ample evidence of
poor conditions in institutional mental health settings, from the
decisions we reviewed, it seems that not all IJs are willing to
interpret relevant legal precedents to allow them to make
inferences about mental health workers’ specific intent based on
those conditions.
B. Guidance for IJs
One possible solution may be for the EOIR to issue guidance
for IJs on adjudicating CAT claims by noncitizens with psychosocial
disabilities, such as by updating its benchbook for IJs.237
Alternatively, the Attorney General may certify certain cases from
the BIA to set forth this guidance. In addition, the EOIR may
endeavor to publish precedential decisions that accord with these

236. See, e.g., Ridore, 696 F. 3d at 917; Guerra v. Barr, 951 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2020),
amended by Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2020).
237. The EOIR’s Immigration Judges Benchbook is a compilation of information aimed
at assisting IJs to adjudicate their cases, such as guidance on how to conduct a competency
hearing pursuant to Matter of M-A-M-. Immigration Judge Benchbook, DEP’T OF JUST.: EOIR
(2020), https://fileshare.eoir.justice.gov/benchbook-archived.zip.
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principles in its online resources disseminating BIA and Attorney
General precedents.238
Immigration adjudicators have at times exasperated Circuit
Court of Appeals judges sitting in review,239 prompting them to call
for immigration officials to adopt common-sense policies that
would expedite both courts’ and immigration adjudicators’
resolution of factually similar removal cases. For example, Judge
Easterbrook has invoked Social Security Administration policies
for social welfare benefits adjudications as worthy examples for
immigration authorities to follow.240 In the absence of precise
guidance as to what kinds of coercive mental health methods may
satisfy the elements of a CAT claim based on the growing scientific
literature, IJs may interpolate their own biases about appropriate
treatment for persons with psychosocial disabilities.
Indeed, beyond the Social Security Administration’s
disability-related benefits adjudications, the disability rights
experience demonstrates the utility of more specific regulations.241
For example, until the 2008 Americans with Disabilities
Amendment Act (ADAAA),242 most Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) litigation centered on whether plaintiffs had a disability as

238. BIA Precedent Chart, DEP’T OF JUST. https://www.justice.gov/eoir/biaprecedent-chart [https://perma.cc/D5ZM-TBK3] (last updated Dec. 27, 2021).
239. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, U.S. Relieves Judge of Duties in Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/nyregion/13judge.html
[https://perma.cc/VGG7-CZEL].
240. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454-55 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The immigration
bureaucracy has much to learn from the experience of other federal agencies that handle
large numbers of comparable claims with individual variations.”). For additional
information on the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) administrative law judges, see
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE
HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT (2010). The GAO’s 2017 report also points to the
SSA hearings. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-37, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY:
ADDITIONAL MEASURES AND EVALUATION NEEDED TO ENHANCE ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY OF
HEARINGS DECISIONS (2017).
241. Note, however, that the purposes of disability benefits programs and
nondiscrimination statutes differ greatly. See Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating
Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (2014) (tracing the Social Security Disability
Insurance program’s roots to the Elizabeth Poor Laws).
242. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)
(expressly rejecting the US Supreme Court’s construction of the ADA disability definition).
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defined by the statute.243 These highly fact-specific and subjective
determinations were susceptible to influence by largely nondisabled judges’ preconceived notions about persons with
disabilities that constricted Congress’ intended scope of statutory
protection.244 As a result, persons with certain kinds of disabilities
could bring suit in one jurisdiction, but not others. The judiciary’s
attention to who had a qualifying disability distracted it from
determining what accommodations they were owed.245 The
ADAAA streamlined ADA cases, diverting scarce judicial resources
to substantive questions.246

243. See Michael Waterstone et al., Disability Cause Lawyering, 53 WILLIAM & MARY L.
REV. 1287, 1348-49 (2012) (summarizing and concurring with scholarly criticisms of the
Supreme Court’s disability definition-centric jurisprudence for contributing to low success
rates by ADA claimants); see also Michael Ashley Stein et al., supra note 241 at 691 (noting
that prior to 2010 over 97 of pre-ADAAA employment disability-based discrimination
claimants in federal courts lost).
244. See Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of
Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19 (2000) reprinted in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA:
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 62 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (arguing that
“[j]udges view the ADA a form of public benefit program for people with disabilities, rather
than a mandate for equality”). See also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Explaining “Not Disabled”
Cases Ten Years After the ADAAA: A Story of Ignorance, Incompetence, and Possibly Animus,
26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 383 (2019) (arguing some post-ADAAA decisions remain
tinged by judicial biases). See generally Anita Silvers et al., Disability and Employment
Discrimination at the Rehnquist Court, 75 MISS. L. J. 945 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to reject paternalistic notions of “protecting”
people with disabilities in ways inconsistent with its race and sex antidiscrimination
jurisprudence).
245. Compare Stein et al., supra note 242, at 694 (arguing to “shift[] the locus of
accommodation disputes from the contentious identity-based contours of the ‘disabled’
plaintiff to the underlying issue of alleged discrimination” in order to “remed[y] problems
arising from excluding ‘unworthy’ individuals from employment opportunity—people
whose functional modes do not comply with prevailing workforce design and
organizational presumptions and who therefore require accommodation”) with City of
Cleburne, TX v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (justifying its decision not
to hold that persons with intellectual disabilities are a quasi-suspect classification because
they are not “all cut from the same pattern . . . they range from those whose disability is
not immediately evident to those who must be constantly cared for”). But see id. at 468
(Marshall, J. concurring) (criticizing the majority for requiring groups to be cut from a
“cookie mold” to constitute a quasi-suspect class).
246. See generally Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Analysis of Case Outcomes Under
the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027 (2013) (observing general judicial
fidelity to Congressional intent in post-ADAAA decisions, while noting “a continuing
judicial unease with disability discrimination claims generally and with reasonable
accommodation requests more specifically”).
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Such guidance should at minimum instruct IJs as to the
following. First, it should be undisputed that certain kinds of
conduct that occurs in mental health facilities cause severe pain or
suffering for the purposes of CAT claims. The denials of CAT claims
we reviewed seem to concede as much. Second, specific intent
inquiries should focus on individual mental health workers’ mental
state, not the more abstract intentions of governmental entities.
Third, evidence of widespread abuses, deplorable conditions,
negligence, ignorance, and resource scarcity should support
circumstantial inferences of specific intent by mental health
workers, not cut against it.247 Fourth, evidence of mental health
workers’ goals of punishing, coercing, or discriminating against
persons with psychosocial disabilities should not be considered to
undercut evidence of specific intent, but instead as evidence of
proscribed purpose that reinforces specific intent evidence.
Finally, it should be undisputed that mental health workers in
state-run facilities are public officials for the purposes of CAT
claims, while ineffectual policies and laws should not negate
acquiescence findings.
Such guidance would serve several purposes. First and
foremost, it would contribute to ensuring that the United States
upholds its obligations under the CAT and customary international
law. Second, it would help to combat the disability bias inured in
highly subjective, fact-specific, and individualized adjudications.248
Third, it would both promote judicial economy and focus strapped
administrative agency resources.249 Fourth, it would ward against

247. As one BIA panel recently stated, “[i]nvoluntarily subjecting a mental health
patient to electroconvulsive therapy, restraining the patient indefinitely, or physically or
sexually abusing him or her, are not ‘conditions’ that result from neglect, a lack of
resources, or insufficient training or education.” Matter of A-E-R-, AXXX XXX 231, 3-4 (B.I.A.
Nov. 12, 2021) (unpublished).
248. Faraaz Mahomed et al., Compulsory Mental Health Interventions and the CRPD:
Minding Equality by Anna Nilsson (Review), 43 HUM. RTS. Q. 616, 618 (2021) (criticizing the
European Court of Human Rights’ proportionality analysis as “easily manipulatable as well
as open-ended” with uneven results in disability rights cases).
249. There is a long-standing backlog in immigration adjudications. See generally,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL
CHALLENGES (2017).
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shifting political winds.250 To the extent that IJs are sensitive to
changing immigration policies across administrations, narrowing
the field of inquiry for CAT claims would ensure that domestic
political priorities do not trump international obligations.
C. CAT Committee Engagement
Finally, immigration and disability rights advocates should
engage the CAT Committee in order to shine a light on trends in
immigration adjudicators’ resolution on of CAT claims by
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities that may undermine
international obligations. The intersection of non-refoulement
protections and disability rights appears to be underexplored by
the CAT Committee, and the emergence of the CRPD may
encourage the Committee to engage this issue.251 For example, in
General Comment No. 4, for example, the CAT Committee does not
mention mental health-related harms as circumstances that dutybearers should consider when implementing their nonrefoulement duty.252
This holds true specifically with regard to the Committee’s
monitoring of the US’ CAT implementation. In its 2013 concluding
obligations on the United States, the CAT Committee did not
address its fulfillment of its CAT article 3 non-refoulement duty in
removal proceedings involving noncitizens with psychosocial
disabilities. Although its most recent list of issues requests specific
information about “the number asylum seekers whose
applications were accepted because they had been tortured or
might be tortured if returned to their country of origin,”253 the
Committee did not inquire specifically about noncitizens with
250. See Jeffrey S. Chase, The Real Message of Matter of R-A-F-, JEFFREY S. CHASE–
OPINIONS/ANALYSIS
ON
IMMIGRATION
LAW
(Mar.
1,
2020),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/3/1/the-real-message-of-matter-of-r-a-f[https://perma.cc/VQJ6-US5Q] (arguing that the Attorney General aimed “not to give
guidance, but to serve warning” on individual BIA appellate judges).
251. See also generally Lord et al., discussion supra 64 (recommending ways that UN
entities might promote a more CRPD-consistent international refugee and asylum law
framework).
252. CAT Committee, supra note 57, ¶ 29.
253. Committee Against Torture, List of Issues Prior to Submission of the Sixth
Periodic Report of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/QPR/6, ¶ 10 (Jan.
26, 2017).
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psychosocial disabilities in removal proceedings.254 In reply, the
United States’ most recent periodic report to the CAT Committee
only mentions its NQRP program briefly, and provides general
quantitative information about grant and denial rates of CAT
claims.255 The Committee can and should address how systematic
errors by IJs in adjudicating CAT claims and how US precedents
and legal standards may be impermissibly narrowing the scope of
CAT non-refoulement protections for noncitizens with
psychosocial disabilities.
In particular, advocates might urge the Committee to
interrogate how the United States’ interpretation of CAT requiring
intent to be “specific” may in effect be too narrow, especially in the
context of removal proceedings, where IJs’ inquiries are inherently
speculative and where they lack opportunities to directly examine
the intentions of putative torturers.256 Additionally, they may
encourage the CAT Committee to press the United States on what
measures it has taken to ensure that immigration adjudicators do
not conflate discrete elements of CAT claims, especially as applied
to mental health coercion.
VII. CONCLUSION
International law’s prohibition of torture is absolute and
encompasses an affirmative duty to prevent refoulement. Justified
critiques of American exceptionalism aside, the CAT is one of the
few international human rights treaties that the United States has
ratified, making its implementation all the more crucial. And
despite not yet ratifying the CRPD, the United States is frequently
heralded as a disability rights pioneer.257 Strengthening its
254. The Committee only inquired specifically about persons with psychosocial
disabilities in US penitentiary or psychiatric facilities. See id.
255. Committee Against Torture, Sixth Periodic Report Submitted by the United
States of America Under Article 19 of the Convention Pursuant to the Simplified Reporting
Procedure, Due in 2018, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/6/7602E, ¶ 56 (Sept. 24, 2021).
256. Relatedly, the CAT Committee has criticized the United States’ “restrictive
interpretation” of mental torture requiring “prolonged mental harm” for impermissibly
contravening the object and purpose of the treaty. Committee Against Torture,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention,
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, United States of
America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2, ¶ 13 (July 25, 2006).
257. See Michael Ashley Stein & Janet E. Lord, Ratify the UN Disability Treaty, FOREIGN
POL’Y IN FOCUS (July 9, 2009), http://fpif.org/ratify_the_un_disability_treaty
[https://perma.cc/KKL7-RZNJ].
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implementation of its non-refoulement duty with respect to
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities is an area yearning for
attention. While it may be that today, due to Matter of M-A-M-,
Franco v. Holder, and the gradual expansion of the NQRP,
noncitizens with psychosocial disabilities in removal proceedings
are likely accessing counsel more frequently than ever, the legal
straits they must navigate to obtain CAT relief remain narrow. As
the IJ decisions we reviewed illustrate, adjudicators may be
overlooking evidence of individual mental health workers’
coercive methods, as well as the extent to which mental health
coercion constitutes conduct proscribed by CAT, to the peril of
individual respondents and the United States’ international
commitments alike. If nothing else, our study underscores the
importance of intersectional approaches to challenges faced by
persons with disabilities in the immigration legal system.258

258. In addition to Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
see Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for a promising application of
disability rights legal standards to persons with disabilities in immigration detention
during the COVID-19 pandemic. 445 F.Supp.3d 709 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2020), rev’d and
remanded by 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021).
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TABLES
A. Table 1. Background of CAT Claimants
Case
Case No. 1 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 14,
2016)
Case No. 2 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2016)
Case No. 3 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2016)
Case No. 4 (I.J. Dec. July 22,
2016)
Case No. 5 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 24,
2017)

Case No. 6 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 20,
2017)
Case No. 7 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21,
2017)
Case No. 8 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 15,
2017)
Case No. 9 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27,
2017)
Case No. 10 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 7,
2018)
Case No. 11 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 25,
2018)
Case No. 12 (I.J. Dec. May 7,
2018)

Country
of Origin
Mexico

Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico

Mental Health Diagnoses
Adjustment Disorder with mixed
Anxiety and Depressed Mood, Major
Depressive
Disorder,
Learning
Disabilities
Paranoid Schizophrenia
Memory Loss, Anxiety, Depression,
unspecified Learning Disability
Depression

Mexico

Schizophrenia, Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder
with
Behavioral
Disturbance, Persistent Depressive
Disorder with Anxious Distress,
Severe Alcohol Use Disorder
Deaf Mute, Pedophilia

Mexico

Schizophrenia

Mexico

Bipolar Disorder, Substance Use
Disorder, Alcohol Use Disorder
Mexico
Schizoaffective Disorder Bipolar
Type,
Anti-Social
Personality
Disorder
Guatemala Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar
Type, and Mild Neurocognitive
Disorder or Borderline Intellectual
Functioning
El
Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder
Salvador
Guatemala Undiagnosed, hears voices
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Case
Case No. 13 (I.J. Dec. May 14,
2018)
Case No. 14 (I.J. Dec. June 22,
2018)
Case No. 15 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2018)
Case No. 16 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 10,
2018)
Case No. 17 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 28,
2018)
Case No. 18 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4,
2018)
Case No. 19 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2018)
Case No. 20 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 19,
2018)
Case No. 21 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20,
2018)
Case No. 22 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 31,
2019)
Case No. 23 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22,
2019)

Case No. 24 (I.J. Dec. June 17,
2019)
Case No. 25 (I.J. Dec. June 27,
2019)
Case No. 26 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 26,
2019)
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Country
of Origin
Mexico

Mental Health Diagnoses
Bipolar Disorder, Schizophrenia

Egypt

Bipolar Disorder

Mexico

Undiagnosed, neurological speech
impairment, auditory hallucinations,
mood fluctuations
Brazil
Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder, Loss
of Consciousness
Mexico
Psychotic Disorder, Personality
Disorder, Schizophrenia, Paranoia,
Delusional Disorder
Guatemala Schizophrenia
El
Salvador
Mexico

Undiagnosed,
intellectual
impairment and possible psychotic
disorder
Bipolar Schizoaffective Disorder

Mexico

Schizophrenia

Guatemala Undiagnosed, auditory and visual
hallucinations
Mexico
Schizophrenia,
Unspecified
Intellectual Disability, Alcohol Use
Disorder, Cannabis Use Disorder,
Unspecified Trauma-and-StressorRelated Disorder
Mexico
Schizophrenia
Kenya

Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder

El
Salvador

Major Depressive Disorder with
Psychotic Features, Stimulant Use
Disorder
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Case
Case No. 27 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2019)
Case No. 28 (I.J. Dec. Dec. 26,
2019)
Case No. 29 (I.J. Dec. 2019)

Case No. 30 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22,
2020)
Case No. 31 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22,
2020)
Case No. 32 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 24,
2020)
Case No. 33 (I.J. Dec. June 30,
2020)

Country
of Origin
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico

Mexico
Mexico
Nicaragua
Guinea

Case No. 34 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 4,
2020)

Mexico

Case No. 35 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 14,
2020)
Case No. 36 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 27,
2020)
Case No. 37 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 16,
2020)
Case No. 38 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 22,
2020)
Case No. 39 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 25,
2020)
Case No. 40 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13,
2021)

Guinea
El
Salvador
Mexico
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Mental Health Diagnoses
Schizophrenia, Chronic Complex
Trauma
Disorder,
Cognitive
Impairment
Undiagnosed, auditory and visual
hallucinations
Unspecified Neurocognitive Disorder
Bordering on Dementia, Generalized
Anxiety Disorder Bordering on
Dementia, Mild
Neurocognitive
Disorder
Schizophrenia
Bipolar Disorder, Schizoaffective
Disorder, Attention Deficit Disorder,
Substance Use Disorder
PTSD, Schizophrenia
Depression, Anxiety, Emotional
Distress with Suicidal Ideation and
Dissociative Episodes
Major Depressive Disorder, PTSD,
Neurocognitive Disorder, Type-2
Diabetes, Epilepsy, Hypertension
Schizophrenia, Psychosis, Anxiety
Disorder
Schizoaffective Disorder

Undiagnosed,
symptoms
depression and anxiety
Guatemala Depression, Schizophrenia

of

El
Schizophrenia
Salvador
Guatemala PTSD, Anxiety Disorder, Depressive
Disorders, possibly Schizophrenia
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Case
Case No. 41 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 26,
2021)
Case No. 42 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 11,
2021)

Country
of Origin
El
Salvador
Mexico

Case No. 43 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 29,
2021)

Mexico

Case No. 44 (I.J. Dec. Apr.
2021)

Mexico

Case No. 45 (I.J. Dec. June
2021)

Mexico

Case No. 46 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 24,
2021)
Case No. 47 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 1,
2021)
Case No. 48 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4,
2021)

Honduras

Case No. 49 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 29,
2021)

Mexico

Mexico
Mexico

[Vol. 45:5

Mental Health Diagnoses
Bipolar Disorder
PTSD,
Major
Neurocognitive
Disorder due to Traumatic Brain
Injury, with Behavioral Disturbance
Attention
Deficit
Hyperactivity
Disorder,
Generalized
Anxiety
Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder,
PTSD, Unspecified Neurocognitive
Disorder
PTSD,
Complex
Trauma,
Schizoaffective
Disorder,
Amphetamine Use Disorder
Major Depressive Disorder, Anxiety
Disorder with Anxious Distress,
Other Psychotic Disorder: Persistent
Auditory Hallucinations, Mild Alcohol
Use Disorder, PTSD
Depressed Mood, Suicidal Ideations,
Visual Hallucinations
Unspecified Depressive Disorder
with Psychotic Features
Major Depressive Disorder, Anxiety
Disorder, Alcohol Use Disorder,
Unspecified Delirium, Delusional
Disorder
Adjustment Disorder with mixed
Anxiety and Depressed Mood, Major
Depressive
Disorder,
Learning
Disabilities
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B. Table 2. Frequently Cited Long-Standing Precedents
Case
Case No. 1 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 14, 2016)

Country
Mexico

Circuit
9th

J-E2

J-F-F1

Case No. 2 (I.J. Dec. July 18, 2016)
Case No. 3 (I.J. Dec. July 18, 2016)
Case No. 4 (I.J. Dec. July 22, 2016)
Case No. 5 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 24, 2017)
Case No. 6 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 20, 2017)
Case No. 7 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21, 2017)
Case No. 8 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 15, 2017)
Case No. 9 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27, 2017)
Case No. 10 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 7, 2018)
Case No. 11 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 25,
2018)
Case No. 12 (I.J. Dec. May 7, 2018)
Case No. 13 (I.J. Dec. May 14,
2018)
Case No. 14 (I.J. Dec. June 22,
2018)
Case No. 15 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2018)
Case No. 16 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 10,
2018)
Case No. 17 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 28,
2018)
Case No. 18 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4, 2018)
Case No. 19 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2018)
Case No. 20 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 19,
2018)
Case No. 21 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20,
2018)
Case No. 22 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 31,
2019)

Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Guatemala
El
Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico

9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th

Egypt

9th

Mexico

9th

1

Brazil

9th

2

Mexico

9th

Guatemala
El
Salvador
Mexico

9th
9th
9th

2

1

Mexico

9th

1

1

Guatemala

9th

1

1

3
3
1
1

1
1
4
3
5

9th
9th

1

1

3

Villegas
11

5
3
10
4
13
2
12
5
1
1
2

10
1
1
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Case
Case No. 23 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22,
2019)
Case No. 24 (I.J. Dec. June 17,
2019)
Case No. 25 (I.J. Dec. June 27,
2019)
Case No. 26 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 26,
2019)
Case No. 27 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2019)
Case No. 28 (I.J. Dec. Dec. 26,
2019)
Case No. 29 (I.J. Dec. 2019)
Case No. 30 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22,
2020)
Case No. 31 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22,
2020)
Case No. 32 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 24,
2020)
Case No. 33 (I.J. Dec. June 30,
2020)
Case No. 34 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 4, 2020)
Case No. 35 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 14,
2020)
Case No. 36 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 27,
2020)
Case No. 37 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 16,
2020)
Case No. 38 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 22,
2020)
Case No. 39 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 25,
2020)
Case No. 40 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13,
2021)
Case No. 41 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 26,
2021)

Country
Mexico

Circuit
9th

Mexico

[Vol. 45:5
J-F-F3

Villegas
3

9th

1

2

Kenya

9th

1

1

El
Salvador
Mexico

9th

1

Mexico

9th

Mexico
Mexico

10th
9th

1
1

3

Mexico

2nd

2

3

Nicaragua

9th

1

1

3

Guinea

4th

Mexico
Guinea

9th
4th

2
1

3

El
Salvador
Mexico

9th

1

2

9th

2

2

Guatemala

9th

1

4

El
Salvador
Guatemala

4th

5

4th

4

9th

1

El
Salvador

J-E1

9th

4
2

2
1

5

2

2
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Case
Case No. 42 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 11,
2021)
Case No. 43 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 29,
2021)
Case No. 44 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 2021)
Case No. 45 (I.J. Dec. June 2021)
Case No. 46 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 24,
2021)
Case No. 47 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 1, 2021)
Case No. 48 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4, 2021)
Case No. 49 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 29,
2021)
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Country
Mexico

Circuit
4th

J-E-

Mexico

4th

1

Mexico
Mexico
Honduras

10th
10th
4th

2
1
4

Mexico
Mexico
Mexico

10th
9th
9th

2
1
2

J-F-F1

Villegas

1
1

2

2
2

1
3
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C. Table 3. Frequently Cited Recent Precedents
Case
Case No. 20 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 19, 2018)
Case No. 21 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20, 2018)
Case No. 22 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 31, 2019)
Case No. 23 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22, 2019)
Case No. 24 (I.J. Dec. June 17, 2019)
Case No. 25 (I.J. Dec. June 27, 2019)
Case No. 26 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 26, 2019)
Case No. 27 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23, 2019)
Case No. 28 (I.J. Dec. Dec. 26, 2019)
Case No. 29 (I.J. Dec. 2019)
Case No. 30 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020)
Case No. 31 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22, 2020)

Circuit
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
9th
10th
9th
2nd

J-R-G-PR-A-FDecided 10/31/18
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
3
Decided
2/26/20

Case No. 32 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 24, 2020)

9th

Case No. 33 (I.J. Dec. June 30, 2020)
Case No. 34 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 4, 2020)
Case No. 35 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 14, 2020)
Case No. 36 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 27, 2020)
Case No. 37 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 16, 2020)
Case No. 38 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 22, 2020)
Case No. 39 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 25, 2020)
Case No. 40 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13, 2021)
Case No. 41 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 26, 2021)
Case No. 42 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 11, 2021)
Case No. 43 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 29, 2021)
Case No. 44 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 2021)
Case No. 45 (I.J. Dec. June 2021)
Case No. 46 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 24, 2021)
Case No. 47 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 1, 2021)
Case No. 48 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4, 2021)
Case No. 49 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 29, 2021)

4th
9th
4th
9th
9th
9th
4th
4th
9th
4th
4th
10th
10th
4th
10th
9th
9th

Guerra

1

Decided
3/23/20

1
2

1
2
1
3
3
6
2
1
2
2
3
4
3
1

1
1

1
4
3
2
2
3
3
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Table 4. Grounds for Denying CAT Relief

Case
Case No. 1 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 14,
2016)
Case No. 2 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2016)
Case No. 3 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2016)
Case No. 4 (I.J. Dec. July 22,
2016)
Case No. 5 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 24,
2017)
Case No. 6 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 20,
2017)
Case No. 7 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 21,
2017)
Case No. 8 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 15,
2017)
Case No. 9 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 27,
2017)
Case No. 10 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 7,
2018)
Case No. 11 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 25,
2018)
Case No. 12 (I.J. Dec. May 7,
2018)
Case No. 13 (I.J. Dec. May 14,
2018)
Case No. 14 (I.J. Dec. June 22,
2018)
Case No. 15 (I.J. Dec. July 18,
2018)
Case No. 16 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 10,
2018)
Case No. 17 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 28,
2018)

Severe Specific Government
Harm Intent
Role

Likelihood

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Case
Case No. 18 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4,
2018)
Case No. 19 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2018)
Case No. 20 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 19,
2018)
Case No. 21 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 20,
2018)
Case No. 22 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 31,
2019)
Case No. 23 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 22,
2019)
Case No. 24 (I.J. Dec. June 17,
2019)
Case No. 25 (I.J. Dec. June 27,
2019)
Case No. 26 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 26,
2019)
Case No. 27 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 23,
2019)
Case No. 28 (I.J. Dec. Dec. 26,
2019)
Case No. 29 (I.J. Dec. 2019)
Case No. 30 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22,
2020)
Case No. 31 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 22,
2020)
Case No. 32 (I.J. Dec. Apr. 24,
2020)
Case No. 33 (I.J. Dec. June 30,
2020)
Case No. 34 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 4,
2020)
Case No. 35 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 14,
2020)
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Severe Specific Government
Harm Intent
Role

Likelihood

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No
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Case
Case No. 36 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 27,
2020)
Case No. 37 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 16,
2020)
Case No. 38 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 22,
2020)
Case No. 39 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 25,
2020)
Case No. 40 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 13,
2021)
Case No. 41 (I.J. Dec. Jan. 26,
2021)
Case No. 42 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 11,
2021)
Case No. 43 (I.J. Dec. Mar. 29,
2021)
Case No. 44 (I.J. Dec. Apr.
2021)
Case No. 45 (I.J. Dec. June
2021)
Case No. 46 (I.J. Dec. Aug. 24,
2021)
Case No. 47 (I.J. Dec. Sept. 1,
2021)
Case No. 48 (I.J. Dec. Oct. 4,
2021)
Case No. 49 (I.J. Dec. Nov. 29,
2021)
TOTALS

Severe Specific Government
Harm Intent
Role

851
Likelihood

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

8

47

30

38
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